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Corporate scandals drive news and media outbursts which temporarily catch the public’s 
interest; however, they may have a more significant effect on the business world. The purpose 
of this dissertation is to determine how executives misconduct affect the stock market price of 
their associated companies. All scandals that occurred between January 2013 and March 2019 
within companies from S&P 500 and NASDAQ indexes were considered, with two exceptional 
cases. For this purpose, an event study methodology was applied. The findings suggest that 
corporate scandals committed by executives negatively affect the stock price of the concerned 
companies.  
Scandals were grouped by characteristics to outline various patterns. Related to type, financial 
scandals cause a more significant impact on the value of companies than personal misconduct. 
In terms of industries, technology is more negatively influenced by the occurrence of a scandal 
than other industries. Regarding the position of the executives in the company, scandals 
concerning individuals in top positions affect more the stock price than scandals exercised by 
lower executives. The last characteristic, being a former or current executive within the 
company, led to inconclusive results regarding the value of the company following a scandal. 
In order to determine which characteristics, the market has penalised most severely in these 
companies under study, a regression analysis was carried out. The results are consistent in 
showing that an executive holding a top position is a crucial negative factor when a scandal is 
announced. 
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Os escândalos corporativos geram notícias e explosões na impressa que captam 
temporariamente o interesse do público, mas que podem ter um efeito mais significativo no 
mundo dos negócios. O objetivo desta dissertação é determinar como é que a indevida conduta 
dos executivos afeta o preço no mercado acionários das empresas associadas aos mesmos. 
Todos os escândalos ocorridos entre janeiro de 2013 e março de 2019 em empresas dos índices 
S&P 500 e NASDAQ foram considerados, com dois casos excecionais. Para tal, foi aplicada 
uma metodologia de estudo de eventos. As conclusões sugerem que os escândalos empresariais 
cometidos por executivos afetam negativamente o preço das empresas em questão.  
Os escândalos foram agrupados por características para delinear vários padrões. Relativamente 
ao tipo, os escândalos financeiros causam um impacto maior no valor das empresas do que a 
indevida conduta pessoal. Em termos industriais, a tecnologia é negativamente mais 
influenciada pela ocorrência de um escândalo do que as outras indústrias. Quanto à posição dos 
executivos na empresa, os escândalos relativos a indivíduos em posições de topo afetam mais 
o preço acionário do que os escândalos exercidos por executivos inferiores. A última 
característica, ser ex-executivo ou atual-executivo na empresa, gerou resultados inconclusivos 
quanto ao valor da empresa após um escândalo. 
Para determinar quais características o mercado penalizou mais severamente nestas empresas 
em estudo, foi realizada uma análise de regressão. Os resultados são consistentes em mostrar 
que um executivo com uma posição de topo é um fator crucial negativo aquando anúncio de 
um escândalo empresarial. 
  
Título: Indevida Conduta dos Executivos e as suas consequências no mercado acionário das 
empresas associadas 
Autor: Cláudia Gaspar 
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1. Introduction  
 
Corporate scandals related to financial misconduct already have its popularity recognized, such 
as fraud, insider dealing, bribery, money laundering, between others. Enron and WorldCom are 
historically known as examples of this type of scandal. However, after October 2017, hence 
after the prominence of #MeToo, scandals related to personal misconduct such as sexual 
harassment, sexual assault, or even physical abuse are recurrent. 
#MeToo is a movement founded in 2006 by Tarana Burke, a civil rights activist, to help 
survivors of sexual violence, especially among young and black women. This hashtag based 
movement begins to emerge around the world after Alyssa Milano, actress, tweeted: "If all the 
women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote 'me too' as a status, we might give 
people a sense of the magnitude of the problem." This tweet came after the allegations of sexual 
assault by the Hollywood mogul and producer, Harvey Weinstein. To fully understand the 
extent of Milano's action, a year after the initial tweet, #MeToo hashtag was used over 19 
million times on Twitter. It represents more than 55000 uses per day.  
Knowing the power which a scandal can have on the company's values, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to investigate how Executive's misconduct affects the market value of the 
company. Moreover, taking into account the lack of relevant research around the subject, this 
dissertation will show an academic value on this "hot" topic. For example, previous literature 
has been focussing, almost exclusively, on financial misconduct scandals in general, without 
specifying any distinction between which position is the scandal been exercise by, if it is by 
regular employees or if it comes from a more higher rank employee such as executives for 
instance. Accordingly, this study will cover all types of scandals committed by executives, 
including the growing number of personal misconduct scandals being disclosed, adding value 
to previous literature. Despite the lack of past research on this subject, the reason why this 
dissertation will only analyse scandals exercised by executives is due to the more significant 
impact an executive action has in comparison to similar actions done by regular workers.  
To achieve the goal of this dissertation, an event study methodology is applied. Normal 
performance is estimated by Constant Mean Return and Market Return Models. Parametric 
tests are conducted to infer whether abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are 
significantly different from zero. Non-parametric tests are performed to check the robustness 
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of the previous results, being the Generalized Signal Test and the Rank Test selected for this 
purpose. 
To understand the effects of corporate scandals with different features, corporate scandals were 
grouped by characteristics. Thus, there is a broader group with all of the corporate scandals to 
understand the overall effect. The other groups are structured by types of scandal; the industry 
to which a company belongs; the type of executive position; and if the executive is a former or 
a current employee. 
From past literature, the common conclusion lies in a significant negative impact on the 
companies' stock price once executives have committed corporate scandals. Furthermore, 
related to the type of scandal, it is expected that financial misconduct scandals still hold a more 
negative influence than personal misconduct scandals. This because the first ones are 
commonly associated with fines and penalties for the companies, meaning more losses to the 
company and therefore, for the investors. Regarding the position of the executive, it is projected 
that top position executives will have higher negative abnormal returns than the lower position 
executives. Hence, the top position has a higher decision power and so more newsworthy. In 
respect to current or former executives, it anticipated that current employees affect more 
negatively the value of the company after the scandal is announced. The reason behind this 
expectation is that current employees are the ones responsible for driving added value to the 
company. Concerning the industries, significant differences are not expected to be found since 
there is no specific industry that has more relevance in the market than others. 
This dissertation is composed of a literature review about corporate scandals, and its impact on 
the company's value as well as in the overall economy. Afterward, in section three, data and 
variables are described. Section four presents all the methodology supporting the results. Then, 
in section five, all the results and findings of this study are shown. Finally, conclusions will be 












2. Literature Review  
 
2.1. Corporate Scandals  
Corporate scandals occur whenever negative information about the company is disclosure, 
which consequently affects the investors' opinion about the company in terms of efficiency, 
transparency, politic effectiveness, and credibility of its managers. Ordinarily, it is related to 
some prohibited act done under the rules of good governance. 
According to Kuhn and Aschcraft (2003), there are three types of corporate scandals. The first 
one, the most commonly known, is associated with fraudulent accounting practices, such as 
mishandling company earnings for individual purpose, booking earnings for fictitious 
transactions, creating phantom affiliates or unique entities to cover the debt, or misleading 
results to avoid tax practices. The second type concerns the misuse of stock options and 
questionable loans in publicly traded companies, for instance, insider trading or option 
backdating. The last type has to do with collusive relationships between supposedly 
independent parties such as financial analysts, banks, auditors, managers, and the board of 
directors. 
Regarding theoretical explanation which justifies the goal to commit corporate scandal, there 
are two primary considerations.  
Firstly, the economic view explains that agents commit corporate crimes in an attempt to 
maximize their own utility (i.e., their personal gain). Chain, Tsai, and Li (2015) also claim that 
executives might commit corporate crimes when the individual utility from the misbehaviour 
is higher than the utility derived from the executive compensation scheme. Watts, Maniam, and 
Leavell (2018) identify that narcissistic and self-confident individuals tend to be more likely to 
commit corporate crimes, but they also recognized that the higher the position in the company, 
the higher are the opportunities to commit illegalities.  
Secondly, the resource-based perspective proposes that corporate scandal is yield by default 
internal factors within the firm, which lead it more inherently disposed to commit corporate 
illegalities. For instance, Kochan (2002) specific highlights five internal characteristics as poor 
organization culture and structure, lack of character from the firms' employees and the pressure 
to excel in the short term formed by market forces and requirements. Moreover, Key (1999) 
argues that by definition culture is the shared beliefs of a company's members, hence the 
existence or inexistence of ethical values will be reflected in the beliefs its members and 
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consequently, will be reflected their behaviours. Baucus (1989) similarly claims that the 
organization's culture influence how ethical decisions are made, and the pressure to adapt 
people behaviour to organizational culture may also lead to unethical conduct. Furthermore, 
Jory, Ngo, Wang, and Saha (2015) alleges that the competitive nature of the business exercise 
a massive pressure on companies' management to the extent of executives losing their jobs if 
they fail to deliver some specific targets. To prevent this situation, some managers engage in 
illegal practices to satisfy investors.  
On the other hand, Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun (2006) discover that many executives 
engage in option backdating practices to increase their options awards further. They compared 
the executive compensation gained illegally with the damage shareholders have suffered from 
the misconduct release. The Authors discover that executive benefit resulted in illegal 
behaviour averages $2.5 million per firm over a five-year period, and once those practices were 
publicly known, the average loss by the shareholders rounds $400 million per firm. Jensen 
(2005) also claims that sometimes executives participate in value-destroying activities to boost 
the value of the shares, therefore, also according to Karoff, Lee, and Martin (2006), such 
activities can indeed be tremendously costly since firms lose real value when they are caught.   
 
2.2. How corporate scandals affect the company’s value 
and the overall economy 
Several types of research have been conducted to analyse the impact of corporate scandals in 
the stock price of a company. Long and Rao (1995) study the effects of unethical behaviour, 
including scandal, bribery, employee discrimination, illegal payments, environmental 
pollution, and insider trading on shareholder wealth. The authors discover that the costs of 
reported unethical corporate behaviour result in significantly negative abnormal returns to 
shareholders. Likewise, Rao and Hamilton (1996) conclude that once their unethical conduct 
publicly exposed a company, it is stock price would fall. Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs (2009) 
also found negative stock price reactions after the announcements of alleged misconduct. 
Karpoff and Lott (1993) find that either the firm's or government's announcements of alleged 
or actual corporate misconduct correspond to an economically and statistically significant loss 
in the company's stock price. Karoff, Lee, and Martin (2006) examined 585 firms targeted by 
SEC for financial misconduct, and they discovered that the imposed market' penalties were 
much more substantial than the penalties imposed on the firms via the legal and regulatory 
system. With a similar conclusion, Armour, Mayer, and Polo (2011) found that companies 
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involved in corporate scandals experience significant abnormal losses on stock prices of 
approximately nine times the penalties and compensation paid.  
Jain, Jain, and Rezaee (2010) analysed stock market reactions to option backdating probe 
announcements, and, for the 245 implicated companies, they detected negative abnormal 
returns. These results were more modest for an internal investigation than for SEC 
announcements, and the most severe results were from the Department of Justice Investigations. 
Bernile, Jarrell, and Mulcahey (2006) found that exposure to options backdating experience 
negative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. Likewise, Narayanan, Schipani, and 
Seyhun (2006) discovered an adverse market reaction after the disclosure of option backdating. 
Janney and Gove (2011) examined the market reaction to the firm's acknowledgment of 
involvement in the US stock option backdating scandal. Firms involved in CSR are less prone 
to experience a corporate scandal; nevertheless, the wrong-doing of this firm are penalized with 
hashed sanctions. They also find evidence that stock price drops less severely if the company 
itself does the discloser.  
Jory, Ngo, Wang, and Saha (2015) conduct more profound research about the corporate scandal 
as they did not restrict their sample on only financially motivated scandals, they include 
personal nature and sexual harassment scandals. All scandals had involved a CEO, directly or 
indirectly. They find that the announcement-period cumulative abnormal return is always 
negative and significant. They also conclude that the days following the announcement 
increases the stock price volatility in the short-term only if the company does not apply 
corrective actions after the scandal. 
Regarding the difference between financial and other types of scandals, Doherty, Dowling, and 
Miller (2011) discovered that people respond less negatively to moral scandals than to financial 
ones, when they do not involve abusive power; otherwise, it substantially affects responses to 
both types of scandals. 
Besides the impact that these corporate scandals have on firms, they also have an impact on 
society. A more extreme view made by Watts, Maniam and Leavell (2018) exhibits evidence 
that companies within the same industry which are subject to negative publicity, not only affects 
the company's net income but as well as investor's decision on how to apply their money, which 
consequently increases the government's duty to look for answers related to this event. As an 
anticipatory answer, the government will create new regulations in order to prevent future 
corporate scandals. Garzert (2015) also argues that the direct economic cost of corporate 
financial misconduct can be a minor element of its overall negative consequences. By reducing 
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the trust in financial markets, financial misconduct may decrease stock market participation and 
potentially increase the cost of capital for all firms. 
 
2.3. Summary 
Previous research shown above suggests that the market reacts negatively to corporate scandals, 
although those covered scandals were almost all related to financial misconduct. Only Long 
and Rao (1995), Rao and Hamilton (1996) and Jory, Ngo, Wang, and Saha (2015) address 
scandals that were not financially motivated. Long and Rao (1995) included employee 
discrimination and environmental pollution announcements. Rao and Hamilton (1996) 
comprised employee discrimination, environmental pollution, and business ethics scandals. At 
last, Jory, Ngo, Wang, and Saha (2015) admitted all types of scandals – like extramarital affairs 
or sexual harassment - linked to CEOs' involvement.  
This dissertation extends the literature review by analysing corporate scandals where only 
executives were involved, and the motivation was not only financially in order to see if the 





















3. Data and Variables 
 
3.1. Data 
In this dissertation, an “event” is defined when there is news related to a corporate scandal 
involving a company´s executive, therefore, by definition, those that show high levels of social 
pressure around the top managers’ related scandal. All analysed events were extracted from 
companies within S&P 500 or NASDAQ indexes between January 2013 and March 2019, with 
two exceptions as it will be specified further ahead. 
The primary sources of the database are the SEC, Financial Times, New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, Bloomberg, Reuters, and VOX. Although the presence in one of those 
journals/websites is not a mandatory criterion, it is the biggest significant factor. After analysing 
the media pressure, a small group of companies was established. All observations were checked 
for its presence in Thomson Reuters Eikon News Tab. In total, there are 40 individual 
observations, with two exceptions, Retrophin, and National Beverage. They were included in 
the sample due to the number of new and pressure related to them. 
All stock prices were retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, and the final sample includes 40 
top managers’ related scandals. 
 
3.2. Variables 
This section shows how data was organized, since corporate scandals have different 
characteristics, and therefore can be grouped in different ways. 
Consequently, those corporate scandals are divided into two types: financial misconduct 
scandals and personal, inappropriate conduct scandals. Financial misconduct scandals are the 
ones involving financial illegalities like fraud, insider trading, bribery, money laundering, 
misleading investors between others. The inappropriate personal scandals are the ones 
concerning people’s improper behaviour as internal misconduct, sexual harassment, sexual 
abuse, rape allegation, among others.  
The scandals are also grouped by their industry. There are six industries in the database: 




Another relevant feature is the type of position that the executive has in the company. There are 
two types of positions: top position and lower position. In order to better understand this feature, 
top positions are Founders, CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, Nº2, Presidents, and Vice Presidents. Lower 
executive positions are the remaining ones.  
The last group reflects the executive’s presence: whether the executive is a current or a former 
worker of the company.   
Table 1 outlines all the corporate scandals and the characteristics mentioned.  
 
Table 1: This table shows all corporate scandals committed by executives between January 2013 and March 2019, 
from US companies listed in S&P 500 or NASDAQ indexes. The two exceptions are identified in bold. 
Nº Name of the company Type Industry Position Former
1   Tesla Inc Financial Consumer Cyclicals CEO Current
2   Apple Inc Financial Technology Executive Former
3   Goldman Sachs Group Inc Financial Financials Executive Former
4   Goldman Sachs Group Inc Financial Financials Executive and Executive Former
5   Goldman Sachs Group Inc Financial Financials Executive Former
6   Qualcomm Inc Financial Technology Executive Former
7   Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc Financial Consumer Non-Cyclicals CEO and CFO Former
8   Micron Technology Inc Financial Technology Executive Current
9   Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp Financial Technology President and Executive Former
10   Microsoft Corp Financial Technology Executive Current
11   L3 Technologies Inc Financial Industrials Executive and Executive Former
12   Citizens Financial Group Inc Financial Financials Executive Former
13   Equifax Inc Financial Industrials CIO Former
14   Equifax Inc Financial Industrials Executive Former
15   Tiffany & Co Financial Consumer Cyclicals Executive Former
16   Raymond James Financial Inc Financial Financials Executive Former
17   Franklin Resources Inc Financial Financials Founder Former
18   Fifth Third Bancorp Financial Financials CFO Former
19   United Continental Holdings Inc Financial Industrials CEO Current
20   Retrophin Financial Healthcare CEO (founder) Former
21   CBS Corp Personal Consumer Cyclicals CEO Current
22   CBS Corp Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Current
23   Bank of America Corp Personal Financials Executive Former
24   Tesla Inc Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Current
25   Amazon.com Inc Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Former
26   JD.com Inc Personal Technology CEO Current
27   Walt Disney Co Personal Consumer Cyclicals CEO (founder) Current
28   Walt Disney Co Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Current
29   Walt Disney Co Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Former
30   Alphabet Inc Personal Technology Executive Current
31   Wynn Resorts Ltd Personal Consumer Cyclicals CEO (founder) Former
32   Morgan Stanley Personal Financials Executive Current
33   Morgan Stanley Personal Financials Executive Current
34   Microsoft Corp Personal Technology Executive Current
35   Ford Motor Co Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Current
36   Monster Beverage Corp Personal Consumer Non-Cyclicals Vice President Current
37   Nike Inc Personal Consumer Cyclicals Nº2 Current
38   Tapestry Inc Personal Consumer Cyclicals Executive Current
39   Intel Corp Personal Technology CEO Current
40   National Beverage Personal Consumer Non-Cyclicals CEO (founder) Current
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Information regarding the name of executives involved and the date of the announcement of 
the scandal are presented in Appendix A. In addition, information on the indices to which the 
companies belong is given in Appendix B. 
 
3.3. Summary of Statistics 
For a better understanding of the sample distribution, Table 2 includes several panels.  
Panel A validates the Index where the companies are listed, Panel B summarizes the types of 
scandals, Panel C shows the scandals by industry, Panel D consider the presence of top 
executives in the scandal, Panel E presents the number of current and former executives 
involved in corporate misconduct, and, at last Panel F displays the number of personal 
misconduct scandal before and after #MeToo. In Appendix C, there is an analysis related to the 
number of people involved in corporate scandals in each company and each industry.  
  
As it can be acknowledged by Panel A the majority of scandals relies on S&P500, 60% of the 
companies are only listed in S&P500 whereas 8% are only listed in NASDAQ, 28% is listed in 
both Indexes and 5% of the sample represent the two exceptions, i.e., the ones that are listed 
neither in S&P500 nor in NASDAQ.  
Regarding the type of scandals, there are 20 cases of financial misconduct and other 20 related 
to inappropriate personal conduct. Regarding the industry, Consumer Cyclicals is the most 
representative one with 13 scandals, followed by Financials with 10 and 9 corporate scandals 
for Technology. Those types of industries represent more than 80% of the sample.  
Looking specific for an executive position, 18 corporate scandals were committed by top 
position executives, whereas 22 were committed by lower position ones. Moreover, 50% of the 
scandals were performed by current executives and 50% by former executives.  
Focusing only on personal scandals, an impressive result was found; 95% of those were only 
disclosed after #MeToo gained strength.  
The last Panel only provides 31 companies, despite the fact there are 40 corporate scandals in 
total, meaning that there are companies in which their executives committed more than one 
corporate scandal. In total, 7 companies show more than one corporate scandal during the 
sample period: Goldman Sachs, Walt Disney, Tesla, Microsoft, Equifax, CBS, and Morgan 
Stanley. However, by more carefully looking at the number of executives involved in scandals, 
there are 46 executives implicated. Eleven companies have more than 1 executive involved, 
being Goldman Sachs, Walt Disney, and Alphabet, the organizations with more persons 
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involved. The same process for the industry, Consumer Cyclicals, Financials and Technology 
has more than 11 executives engaged in corporate scandals. 
 





Index Nº Scandals %
S&P500 35 88% Panel G:
NASDAQ 14 35% Number of scandals in each company Nº Scandals %
Only S&P500 24 60% 1   Goldman Sachs Group Inc 3 8%
Only NASDAQ 3 8% 2   Walt Disney Co 3 8%
Both 11 28% 3   Tesla Inc 2 5%
None 2 5% 4   Microsoft Corp 2 5%
5   Equifax Inc 2 5%
Panel B: 6   CBS Corp 2 5%
Type Nº Scandals % 7   Morgan Stanley 2 5%
Financial 20 50% 8   Apple Inc 1 3%
Personal 20 50% 9   Qualcomm Inc 1 3%
Sum: 40 10   Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc 1 3%
Panel C: 11   Micron Technology Inc 1 3%
Industry Nº Scandals % 12   Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp 1 3%
Consumer Cyclicals 13 33% 13   L3 Technologies Inc 1 3%
Financials 10 25% 14   Citizens Financial Group Inc 1 3%
Technology 9 23% 15   Tiffany & Co 1 3%
Industrials 4 10% 16   Raymond James Financial Inc 1 3%
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 3 8% 17   Franklin Resources Inc 1 3%
Healthcare 1 3% 18   Fifth Third Bancorp 1 3%
Sum: 40 19   United Continental Holdings Inc 1 3%
Panel D: 20   Retrophin 1 3%
Executive Position Nº Scandals % 21   Bank of America Corp 1 3%
Top Position 18 45% 22   Amazon.com Inc 1 3%
Lower Position 22 55% 23   JD.com Inc 1 3%
Sum: 40 24   Alphabet Inc 1 3%
Panel E: 25   Wynn Resorts Ltd 1 3%
Current or Former Nº Scandals % 26   Ford Motor Co 1 3%
Current 20 50% 27   Monster Beverage Corp 1 3%
Former 20 50% 28   Nike Inc 1 3%
Sum: 40 29   Tapestry Inc 1 3%
Panel F : 30   Intel Corp 1 3%
Personal Scandals Nº Scandals % 31   National Beverage 1 3%
After #MeToo 19 95% Sum: 40




4. Methodology  
 
4.1. Event Study Methodology  
An event study uses financial market data to analyses the impact of a specific event on the value 
of the company by its share price. With this methodology, it is possible to understand if there 
is an abnormal change in the market price associated with an unanticipated event, inferring the 
significance of the event.  
The first published event study was from James Dolley (1933), who examined the impact of 
stock splits on market prices. However, it was Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fischer, 
Jensen, and Roll (1969) who introduced the standard method nowadays used. The first ones 
considered the earnings’ information, and the second ones tested the effects of stock splits on 
the stock prices, controlling for confounding events.    
For McWilliams and Siegel (1997) three assumptions are underlying an event study: Market 
efficiency, unanticipated event, and isolation of confounding effects. The first one implies that 
the effects of an event should immediately be reflected in the stock prices because markets 
ought to include all the information available for traders. Regarding the second assumption, the 
event under study must be unanticipated. Therefore, the market did not have any previous 
information about the event, reflecting the implications immediately on the market price as 
described in the first assumption. With this, it is expected that the stock market only reacts to 
the information that investors receive about the event on the announcement day. In what 
concerns the last assumption, it is mandatory to be sure that there are no confounding effects 
during the event window, as other events might be overlapping this particular event study, 
influencing the companies’ financial performance.  
Even though there is no unique structure, there is a general flow of analysis presented by 
Macklinlay (1997) in 7 steps. Firstly, an event of interest is defined as well as the event window 
(i.e., the examination period over the companies’ stock prices). The second step involves the 
definition of the selection criteria for the inclusion of companies in the study. Thirdly, to analyse 
the event’s impact, it is necessary the measure of the abnormal return, for which the normal 
return is also needed. There are several options for modelling the normal returns, being the most 
common ones the Constant Mean Return Model and the Market Return Model. After designing 
the model, the fourth step, it is essential to define the estimation window, where the parameters 
are estimated. Generally, the estimation window precedes the event window, to prevent the 
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event’s influence in the estimation of the normal performance model. Therefore, it is possible 
to calculate the abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  
The fifth stage serves to test the sample for the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns, 
being of high relevance, define the null hypothesis and the techniques for aggregating the 
individual company abnormal returns. There are several tests - parametric and non-parametric 
tests - to infer the statistical significance of ARs and their quality depends on the characteristics 
of the inherent data. Potential problems can emerge when testing the hypothesis. They should 
be taken into account because ARs is, frequently, not independent and/or they do not have 
identical variance. Binder (1998) summarizes this subject as follows: abnormal return 
estimators often have a cross-sectional correlation in the event horizon, heterogeneity variance 
across companies, correlation across time for an individual company, or even higher variance 
during the event-period than comparing to the surrounding periods. Although it is essential to 
be aware of such characteristics, it is often possible to merely ignore them as, in practice, they 
are minor.  
In the sixth phase, results are introduced, finishing this analysis with the seventh phase, the 
interpretation and the conclusion of the results. 
Proceeding this general flow, the conclusions from the event study are valid if readers are 
confident that the researcher has genuinely identified the abnormal returns associated with the 
event. 
 
4.2. Constructing Abnormal Returns and Parametric 
Tests 
To test the market reaction to the scandal, it is essential to compute the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs). In order to do that, some steps must be followed. 
The first step is to compute the Abnormal Returns (ARs), using formula 1: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) (1) 
Where 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡= Abnormal Returns 
𝑅𝑖𝑡= Actual Return 





To estimate the normal performance, two statistical models were computed: The Constant Mean 
Return Model and the Market Model.  
 
Constant Mean Return Model (CMRM) is probably the simplest model, therefore, in some cases 
can even be more successful than sophisticated models. The expected return 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] is assumed 











The abnormal return of company 𝑖 on day 𝑡 (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) can be calculated the following way: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] (3) 
 
Alternatively, the Market Model (MM) uses the market portfolio to predict the returns of a 
security i. In this case, the normal performance is defined as: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
Where 
𝑅𝑖𝑡= Return of a security i 
𝑅𝑚𝑡= Actual Return 
𝛼𝑖= intercept term 
𝛽𝑖= systematic risk 
𝜀𝑖𝑡= zero mean error term 
 
 
With this model, the Abnormal Return of company 𝑖 on day 𝑡 (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) can be calculated the 
following way: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) (5) 
 
This methodology represents a potential improvement over the CMRM by eliminating a portion 
of the returns that are related to market variations. Thus, the variance of the abnormal return is 
reduced, and more accurate are the results. The advantage of using the Market Model will 
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depend on the R2 of the regression: the higher the R2, the greater is the reduction of the variance 
of the abnormal returns, and the higher is the gain of using this model. In this dissertation, both 
models are applied since CMRM is useful to compare results from the MM.  
In order to test the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is divided by the standard 



















The significance level is form on 𝑇 − 2 degrees of freedom. 
  
To achieve all inferences of the event, the abnormal returns have to be aggregated. This 
aggregation is based in two dimensions – through time and across companies. Firstly, as 
MacKinlay (1997) said, it is necessary to compute the aggregation through time – the 
cumulative abnormal return. This concept aggregates all measured effects of the event on the 
stock price of company 𝑖′ 𝑠, and it is calculated as: 
 













Where Standard Deviation of CAR is: 











Additionally, to compute the aggregation across securities, another concept was introduced – 
the Standardized Abnormal Return (SAR). This process gives to each abnormal return the same 







With  𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 being: 
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = {𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖




(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ )
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2 = Residual variance 
𝑅𝑚𝑡= Market return on day 𝑡 
 𝑅𝑚̅̅ ̅̅  = Average return on the market portfolio 
 
 
The standardized abnormal returns can be cumulated over the time period of the event window 











Assuming that the values of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 are independent and identically distributed when 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is 
divided by its standard deviation, its values are identically distributed. The average effect of the 
event on all companies in the sample on day t is given by the average standardized cumulative 


























To test the hypothesis of 𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 being significantly different from zero can be computed as:  
 
𝑍𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 × 𝑛
0.5 (16) 
 
If 𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 is statistically significant, it is possible to infer that the event had an impact on the 
stock price of the n firms. 
The aggregation of abnormal returns assumes that there are no overlaps between the windows 
of security events, which allows to aggregate the AR without having problems related to a zero 
covariance. In this dissertation, this problem does not apply since the event window of all 
securities are different. 
 
4.3. Non-parametric tests 
Parametric tests are perceived to be less accurate at testing the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns since it depends on the assumption of normality. Non-parametric tests are an alternative 
approach as they do not require such demanding restrictions about return distributions and 
potentially, produce more powerful results. Those tests are typically used in-line with 
parametric tests to authenticate the results as not driven by outliers. Therefore, they provide 
robustness checks for parametric ones. This situation is especially significant for small samples 
due to the impact a single firm's returns can have on the sample statistic. Based on Rani, Yadav, 
and Jain (2016), I used the generalized sing test and rank test.  
  
The generalized sign test presented by Cowan (1992) is a developed version of the sign test. 
The sign test is a binomial test that assesses if the frequency of positive abnormal returns equals 
50%. The generalized sign test, instead of assuming a fraction of 0.5, adjusts the fraction to 
positive abnormal returns in the estimation period. Hence, it investigates if the number of stocks 
with positive cumulative abnormal returns in the event window surpasses the number expected 
in the absence of abnormal returns, that is, a period unaffected by the event. The advantage of 
this test is the not required symmetry of the cross-sectional abnormal return distribution and the 
more reliability as the length of the event window increases. 
 
























  Where T is the estimation window 
 
The generalized sign test uses the normal approximation to the binomial distribution with 










𝑤= number of stocks in the event window for which the cumulative abnormal return is positive 
 
 
Under the null hypothesis, there is no difference between the proportion of positive returns in 
the event window and its proportion of positive returns in the estimation window. 
  
The rank test developed by Corrado (1989), based on a residuals’ ranking, exams the existence 
of abnormal returns. This test considers the combined estimation and the event window as a 
single set of returns. Then, assigns a rank to each firm. Rank one is attributed to the smallest 
residual.  
The issue relies on the construction: the ranks of the residuals of different days are dependent. 
However, Campbell and Weasley (1993) argue that for a short event window, the effect of 
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?̃?= Expected rank of the company i 
𝑁= Number of companies 
𝐿= Total number of observations in the estimation and event window 
𝑆𝑘= standard deviation 
𝐾𝑖𝑡= Rank of the abnormal return of company i at time t 
𝜏 = 𝑇1 + 1 to 𝜏 = 𝑇2 = Beginning and the end of the event window  
 
4.4. Regressions 
Additionally, the impact of specific criterions in the results of CARs of the companies was 
analysed. This step will help this dissertation to understand which corporate scandals' 
characteristics will the market penalize harder. The regression analysis allows us to establish 
these conclusions. 
The impact on the company’ results of the type of industry, type of scandal, type of position of 
the executive and whether the executive is a former or a current employee was assessed. 
  
First of all, to analyse the impact of the industry in the CARs, this dissertation includes the CAR 
as a dependent variable and industries dummies as independent variables. As previously 
mentioned, there are 6 different industries; therefore, 5 dummies were created in the regression, 
as followed: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑁𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (22) 
Where: 
𝛼 = constant  
𝜀𝑖 = error term 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝑇𝑒𝑐𝑖, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑁𝐶𝑖 and 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑖 indicate the following industries: Financials, Technologies, 
Industrials, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, and Healthcare.  
 
The intuition behind is: if 𝛽1 = 1, the enterprise is in the financial industry and 𝛽1 =0 if it is 
not; If 𝛽2 = 1, the company is in the technology industry and 𝛽2 = 0 if it is not; if 𝛽3 = 1 the 
corporation is in the industrial industry and 𝛽3 = 0 if it is not; if 𝛽4 = 1 the firm is in the 
consumer non-cyclical industry and 𝛽4 = 0 if it is not; and for last; if 𝛽5 = 1 the company is in 




The second regression intends to seek the impact which the type of scandals have on CARs: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (23) 
Where 
𝛼 =  constant 
𝜀𝑖 = error term 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 indicates financial corporate scandals.  
 
 
The rationality behind this equation is: if 𝛽1 = 1, the scandal is financial and if 𝛽1 = 0, 
otherwise. Additionally, 𝛼 absorbs the impact of personal scandals.  
 
The same logic was applied for the type of position of the executive: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (24) 
Where 
𝛼 = constant 
𝜀𝑖 = error term 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖 indicates executives with a lower position 
 
 
The subjacent logic is: if 𝛽1 = 1, scandal is committed by an executive with lower position, and 
if 𝛽1 = 0, otherwise. In addition, 𝛼 absorbs the impact of the scandals committed by executives 
with a higher position. 
 
The last regression interprets the influence of an executive being a former/current employee on 
the company: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (25) 
Where 
𝛼 = constant 
𝜀𝑖 = error term 





The insight underlying it is: if 𝛽1 = 1, a scandal is committed by a former employee and if 𝛽1 =
0, otherwise. Moreover, 𝛼 absorbs the impact of the scandals committed by current executives.  
 
4.5. Estimation and Event Window  
In previous sections, it was defined that the estimation window is used for the expected returns’ 
calculation. According to Mackinlay (1997), the estimation window with 250 prior days from 
the corporate scandal was used. It is a commonly used the period prior to the event window for 
the estimation window and does not include any overlap between these two to prevent the event 
from having any influence in the estimated returns. The characterization of the event window 
is rather complex, as McWilliams and Siegel (1997) described. The length of the event window 
must be select in order to capture the abnormal returns of the event without including any 
confounding effects. The day before the event should be analysed since information may be 
leak out before the announcement and, because it is likely that investors do not react 
immediately to the announcements, the event window may also include the day after the event. 
In addition, the event window can be extended to understand whether the event created prolong 
significant negative abnormal returns allowing to see how long it took to recover from the 
scandal. Consequently, to understand the impact of the announcement of inappropriate 
behaviour in the market price of the companies, this study analyses three different event 
windows.  
 
The first window of the event goes from the day before to the third day after the scandals 
disclose – (-1,3). The reason for this length is to capture cases where the information was leaked 
before the announcement and to access if there is a prolonged effect of the scandal.  
The other event window ranges from the day of the announcement to three days after the event 
– (0,3). In this case, this dissertation does not include any day before the announcement day as 
companies avoid to leak information about such scandals publicly. For instance, in terms of 
financial scandals, the announcements are made by government agencies, and they are expected 
to be more reliable and therefore harder to have information leakage. Regarding inappropriate 
personal scandals, companies often try to hide these cases and, when it is not possible, they 
minimize them by changing the type of inappropriate behaviour that the executive has 
committed. 
The last window of the event goes from the day before the event to the day after – (-1,1), to 
understand the short-term impact of the scandal. 
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The advantage of having these three event windows besides the comparison between them is 
the validation of the assumptions described at the beginning of this methodology. 
 
4.6. Hypothesis 
Based on previous literature, corporate scandals committed by executives are expected to hold 
a significant negative impact on the market value of their companies.  
Accessing the type of corporate scandals, as literature review mentioned, it is expected that 
financial misconduct scandals still hold a more negative influence than personal misconduct 
scandals since the latter are commonly associated with fines and penalties for the companies, 
turning into more losses to the company and therefore for the investors. Nevertheless, it is 
expected to discover some significant results in personal misconduct, since this type of scandal 
is more visible now than before. This is again in-line with the changing awareness created from 
movements like #Metoo. 
Moreover, it is expected that corporate scandals committed by top position executives produce 
a more negative effect on returns than the scandals committed by lower position executives, not 
only because they are a bigger target of media reactions, but mainly due to the fact that top 
executives like CEOs, CFOs, Founders, Presidents, among others, representing how the 
company is managed and which values emerge from such direction. Therefore, illegal actions 
from such higher-position organizational hierarchy make investors doubt management skills 
and lack of trust in the specific company. 
Furthermore, scandals exercised by current executives are expected to influence more the 
company’s value than the scandals committed by former executives. The reason behind this 
expectation is that current employees show the actual values the company is driven by. In the 
case of former executives’ scandals, a lot of times, companies already know the existence of 
the scandal before going to the public. Therefore, they had time to implement strategies to 
change these values and, consequently prevent the existence of corporate scandals. 
Those conclusions are expected to be achieved in all results from this dissertation. 
 
4.7. Confounding Events 
It is crucial to ensure that the results are only caused by the event and not influenced by another 
confounding event. A reduced length of the event window reduces that likelihood. The fact that 
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almost all companies in this database belong to the largest US companies means that they are 
mostly international, which makes them more likely to be affected by confounding effects. 
To deal with this situation, Foster (1980) suggests eliminating the abnormal returns of the day 
of the confounding event.  

































As mentioned before, 40 corporate scandals were analysed. Through the three-event windows, 
many scandals have individual negative significant abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. 
However, to take more inferences, is essential to understand the effect of the scandals not only 
in an individual way but also in a group way. Moreover, it is also vital to conclude which 
features would imply a more significant impact on companies after the scandal’s 
announcement. Consequently, a regression analysis will be present. 
Therefore, in this section, it will be presented the individual ARs and the CARs, a study of the 
corporate scandals grouped, and the regression analysis. The analysed groups are all corporate 
scandals together, the different types of corporate scandal, the different industries, the different 
executives’ positions, and for last, the different situations in the company - current or former 
executives. 
 
5.1. Individual Corporate Scandals 
Taking into account the large size of the database, the individual analysis of each corporate 
scandal would be time-consuming, and it would not bring any practical advantage. 
Nevertheless, all the ARs, CARs, and the respective T-starts are presented in Appendix D.  
As previously mentioned, throughout the three-event windows, there are several negative ARs 
and CARs.  
Figure 1 presents the CARs for both models – CMRM and MM - in three graphs, correspondent 
to each event window. To effortlessly visualize the results, as some values are small and 
challenging to understand in the graphs, table 3 illustrates a summary statistic about the CARs. 
 
Table 3: This table shows CARs’ summary statistics for both models – CMRM and MM - for the three-event 
windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). The summary statistics are how many negative CARs are in the 40 corporate 
scandals, how many negative and significant CAR there are in the sample, and the same for positive and significant 
CARs. 
 
CMRM MM CMRM MM CMRM MM
  (-1,3) 13 26 2 6 1 0
  (0,3) 10 24 3 6 4 1









Figure 1: This figure shows the CARs’ graphs for both models – CMRM and MM- for the three-event windows: 
(-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). The lighter colours represent the companies which their CAR is significant at least at 10% 



































































































































































































































































































































By looking to the graphs and this table, it is possible to conclude that MM proves to show 
more negative CARs for the three-event windows than CMRM. Similarly, in significance 
terms, MM displays more cases of negative and significant CARs and less episodes of 
positive and significant CARs than CMRM, for every event window. Those results are 
elucidated by the fact that CMRM includes a portion of the returns that is related to variation 
in the market's return. In this case, produces more positive CARs than negatives, showing 
that, in general, the market is growing. It is essential to highlight that in MM more than half 
of the sample has negative CAR, as opposed to the CMRM where approximately a quarter 
of the sample show negative CARs.  The reason for this is exclusively related to the market 
presence in CMRM since all scandals happened on distinct dates. Therefore, there is no 
confounding event that affects all of the scandals simultaneously. 
 
5.2. All Corporate Scandals 
To analyse the overall impact of scandals, ACSARs were calculated. Depending on the chosen 
event window, there are different significance levels attached to them, as Table 4 illustrates.  
 
Table 4: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of all companies that an executive 
commits a corporate scandal grouped for CMRM and MM, for the three-event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). 
The z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no ACSAR is equal to zero is rejected or not. 
 
*Rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level 
** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level 
*** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level 
 
Starting with the event window (-1,3), it is conceivable to understand that in MM, all of ACSAR 
are negative and they are all significant at least at 5% level after the scandal is announced. In 
respect to CRMR, there are negative ACSAR on the day of the announcement and in the day 
Window Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
-1 0.17278 1.09274 -0.01372 -0.08680
0 -0.03653 -0.23107 -0.40712 -2.57487 **
1 -0.07772 -0.49154 -0.48451 -3.06432 ***
2 0.14519 0.91824 -0.34888 -2.20653 **
3 0.26319 1.66458 * -0.32955 -2.08424 **
0 -0.56902 -3.59883 *** -0.23104 -1.46121
1 -0.59174 -3.74251 *** -0.31800 -2.01121 **
2 -0.39924 -2.52505 ** 0.11062 0.69960
3 -0.36608 -2.31530 ** 0.40700 2.57407 **
-1 0.17278 1.09274 -0.01372 -0.08680
0 -0.03653 -0.23107 -0.40712 -2.57487 ***







after, but with no significance. On the other hand, on the third day after the announcement, the 
ACSAR is significantly but positive. 
In the event window (0,3), the CMRM holds since the day of the scandal, negative and 
significant ACSAR. Especially the day and the day after the announcement with the most 
significantly negative results. Regarding MM, the first two days of the event have negative 
ACSAR, but only the day after the scandals disclose confirms a significant result at 5% level, 
probably showing delay in investors’ reaction. The second and third days of the event has 
positive ACSAR. The third day after the announcement is significant at 5% level, showing 
recovery from the hit.  
In the last event window, (-1,1), the CMRM yield negative ACSAR for the day of the 
announcement and the day after. However, both results are not significant. In the MM, both the 
day and the day after the announcement are negative and significant ACSARs at 1% level.  
  
To sum up, CMRM only shows evidence of negative impact from the corporate scandal in the 
event window (0,3), whereas MM shows a negative impact in all event windows. Because 
CMRM has a portion of the market’s returns makes results of MM more reliable of the isolated 
impact of the executives misconducts. Therefore, it is possible to argue that corporate scandals 
committed by executives affect the company’s market stock price. 
  
To check the robustness from previous parametric results, this section analyses the results of 
the non-parametric tests and establish a relation to the parametric tests. The results are present 
in table 5.  
 
Table 5: This table shows the results for non-parametric tests - Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test – for all 
companies grouped for CMRM and MM, for the three event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). 
  
When applying CMRM, the event window (-1,3) and (-1,1) do not provide any statistical 
evidence. However, in the event window (0,3), the generalized sign test shows that the 
proportion of positive returns in the event window is statistically different from its proportion 
of positive returns in the estimation window at 10% confidence level for all companies. 
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Regarding MM, there are no signs of differences between the event window nor the estimation 
window.  
The rank test does not reveal any statistical evidence in neither of the models across all event 
windows. As a consequence, the null hypothesis of absent abnormal returns cannot be rejected.  
 
The results obtained for both models as well as for the three-event windows present 
inconsistency across the parametric and the non-parametric tests. In CMRM, parametric tests 
express to be statistical significance in the event window (0,3) and in MM, parametric tests 
confirm statistically negative results in all event windows. Though, generalized sign test only 
shows significance in CMRM and when the event window is (0,3). The rank test is not 
significant in any model.  
These differences can be explained by the fact that the generalized sign test does not take into 
account the magnitude of the values. Corrado (1989) describes the rank test for a one-day event 
window and, in this dissertation, a three, four, and five days of event window are applied. 
Additionally, Cowan (1992) states that as the size of the event window increases, the rank test’s 
power decreases faster than the sign test. Moreover, those results do not come up as a surprise 
since each corporate scandal is unique. The way each company deals with the executives’ 
illegalities, the magnitude of the government’s penalties (in the cases of financial misconduct), 
and the different media coverage suffered by each company will influence the investors’ 
reaction differently. 
  
Succinctly, even that the parametric and non-parametric do not show consistent results because 
of theoretical flaws or even because of the specifications of the event, the overall conclusion is 
that executives’ misconduct affect the stock price of the companies. 
 
5.3. Group of Corporate Scandals divided by their Type 
As previously mentioned, there are two types of corporate scandals: personal misconduct and 
financial misconduct. This section interprets the results by grouping the scandals in these two 
categories as table 6 presents.   
 
Observing the event window (-1,3) concerning CMRM, only personal misconduct has negative 
ACSAR one day after the scandal announcement, although not significant. Conversely, the 
group of financial misconduct does not show negative results on any day of the event window. 
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Regarding MM, all event windows, either personal or financial misconduct, have negative 
ACSARs. For the personal misconduct, only the day after the announcement is significant. For 
financial misconduct, every day is significatively influencing the market price of the companies 
with the exception of the second day after the announcement.  
 
Table 6: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of personal misconduct scandals 
and financial misconduct scandals for CMRM and MM, for the three-event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). The 
z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no ACSAR is equal to zero is rejected or not. 
 
For the event window (0,3), CMRM establishes a significant negative impact on both types of 
scandal. With MM, personal misconduct shows negative impact on the day of the 
announcement, and the day after, but providing no significant level. Moreover, the last day of 
the event window shows significant positive values, presenting signs of recovery from the hit. 
In regards to financial misconduct, the day of the announcement, and the day after, affect 
significantly negative the stock price of the companies at 10% level of confidence. The other 
two days are not significant.  
Window Sample Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
-1 0.16444 0.73540 -0.01807 -0.08082
0 0.10474 0.46843 -0.33945 -1.51809
1 -0.03305 -0.14782 -0.53108 -2.37508 **
2 0.17181 0.76835 -0.36544 -1.63429
3 0.40752 1.82248 * -0.26006 -1.16301
-1 0.18112 0.80998 -0.00937 -0.04192
0 -0.17781 -0.79521 -0.47479 -2.12334 **
1 -0.12239 -0.54732 -0.43794 -1.95852 *
2 0.11857 0.53024 -0.33233 -1.48621
3 0.11887 0.53159 -0.39904 -1.78455 *
0 -0.47588 -2.12820 ** -0.02927 -0.13091
1 -0.65419 -2.92562 ** -0.24358 -1.08933
2 -0.42012 -1.87885 * 0.16493 0.73757
3 -0.29097 -1.30126 0.72827 3.25693 ***
0 -0.66217 -2.96131 *** -0.43280 -1.93555 *
1 -0.52930 -2.36709 ** -0.39242 -1.75494 *
2 -0.37837 -1.69211 * 0.05631 0.25182
3 -0.44119 -1.97307 ** 0.08572 0.38335
-1 0.16444 0.73540 -0.01807 -0.08082
0 0.10474 0.46843 -0.33945 -1.51809
1 -0.03305 -0.14782 -0.53108 -2.37508 **
-1 0.18112 0.80998 -0.00937 -0.04192
0 -0.17781 -0.79521 -0.47479 -2.12334 **



















Related to the event window (-1,1), CMRM presents similar results for both misconducts, 
although their significance is null.  
 
All in all, the event window (0,3) is the only case of CMRM that shows a negative influence 
from both types of scandals on the companies’ stock price. In the case of using MM, financial 
scandals always produce a negative impact on the stock price of the companies regardless of 
the choice of the event window. When applying the same model, personal scandals present the 
same conclusion than financial scandals for the event windows (-1,3) and (-1,1). Having this 
said, it is possible to see and conclude, that in all cases, financial misconduct has a more lengthy 
and robust effect on the company’s value than in personal misconduct. 
  
This section studies the robustness of the parametric results, analysing the results of the non-
parametric tests Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test. All results are presented in table 7.  
 Table 7: This table shows the results for non-parametric tests - Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test – for personal 
misconduct and financial misconduct scandals for CMRM and MM, for the three-event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and  
(-1,1). 
 
According to the table, by using CMRM, the generalized sign test is significant at least 10% in 
the event window from (-1,3) and (0,3) for personal misconduct. On the other hand, using the 
MM, the generalized sign test shows significant at 1% level for financial misconduct in the 
event window (-1,3).  
For those three cases, the number of stocks with positive cumulative abnormal returns in the 
event window exceeds the number expected in the estimation window.  
The rank test shows statistical evidence for both models in all event windows for financial 
misconduct. In the event windows (-1,3) and (0,3) this significance is at 10% level and for (-
1,1) this level of confidence is around 5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis of absent abnormal 
returns can be rejected for financial misconduct. 
 
Window Misconduct CMRM MM CMRM MM
Personal 1.68020 * 0.47943 0.04403 0.74296
Financial -0.27366 -2.81068 *** 1.72412 * 1.75692 *
Personal 2.14027 ** 0.03220 0.01062 0.77780
Financial 0.63250 -1.46543 1.86068 * 1.90288 *
Personal 1.22012 0.92665 -0.03743 0.80734




Generalized Sign Test Rank 
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The obtained results show some discrepancy across the parametric and the non-parametric tests. 
For financial misconduct, parametric tests show statistical significance in MM for all event 
windows as well as in CMRM for the event window (0,3). For personal misconduct, using 
CMRM, it is not shown the same significance level from (-1,3) and (-1,1). The same applies to 
MM from the event window (0,3). In the case of non-parametric tests, the generalized sign test 
presents personal misconduct to be only significant, in CMRM, in the event windows (-1,3) and 
(0,3). Financial misconduct it is significant at (-1,3) once MM is used.  
The differences between this test and the parametric test can be once more explained by the fact 
that this test does not take into consideration the test’s magnitude, but the sign.  
Moreover, looking at the Rank test, financial misconduct is always significant, whereas 
personal misconduct is never significant. Therefore, this test for financial misconduct scandals 
shows similar conclusions to parametric tests and does not hold the same conclusions for 
personal misconduct, since significant results are not found.  
 
In summary, financial misconduct causes a more negative impact on the value of companies 
than personal misconduct. Such a result was expected since investors are aware that this type 
of scandal is associated with fines and penalties. Above and beyond, investors may be afraid 
that the executive has committed more illegalities that have not yet been disclosed and, thus, 
affect the company concerned and its investments.  
 
The difference in this topic might not be related to the media coverage that both types of scandal 
have. As was possible to see in the latest times, personal scandals are having a lot of media 
coverage and thus, social pressure. However, this pressure is not being sufficient to change 
investors’ view about the companies’ performance only because an executive committed 
personal misconduct. 
 
5.4. Group of Corporate Scandals divided by Industries 
As mentioned before, the study covers six industries. Once all corporate scandals grouped 
within its industry, it is possible to analyse the impacts in the economy of different industries. 





From the event window (-1,3), presented in table 8, one can see that neither Financials, 
Healthcare, nor Industrials shows any statistical significance under both models.  
 
Table 8: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of each industry for CMRM and 
MM, for the event windows (-1,3). The industries are Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, Financials, 
Healthcare, Industries, and Technology. The z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no ACSAR is equal 
to zero is rejected or not. 
 
Consumer Cyclicals, using CMRM, displays significant ACSAR on the third day after the 
announcement but with positive impact. Contrarily, for MM, any day of the event window 
presents negative ACSAR, being significant at 5% level in the day after the announcement only. 
For Consumer Non-Cyclicals, neither of the models express the impact on the value of the 
Window Sample Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
-1 0.22071 0.79579 -0.01365 -0.04920
0 0.01041 0.03752 -0.40195 -1.44925
1 -0.18406 -0.66363 -0.66887 -2.41166 **
2 0.39646 1.42945 -0.17842 -0.64331
3 0.55335 1.99515 ** -0.13481 -0.48606
-1 0.72695 1.25911 0.27606 0.47815
0 0.75757 1.31214 0.15203 0.26332
1 0.51550 0.89287 -0.19030 -0.32961
2 0.71374 1.23623 -0.07498 -0.12987
3 0.98565 1.70720 * 0.07364 0.12754
-1 0.00245 0.00776 -0.30283 -0.95764
0 -0.01236 -0.03908 -0.47245 -1.49401
1 0.18265 0.57759 -0.39324 -1.24352
2 0.28655 0.90614 -0.44009 -1.39167
3 0.31948 1.01029 -0.43938 -1.38943
-1 1.10351 1.10351 0.54427 0.54427
0 0.44180 0.44180 0.46190 0.46190
1 -0.21197 -0.21197 0.20472 0.20472
2 -0.14990 -0.14990 0.06161 0.06161
3 -0.25380 -0.25380 -0.21623 -0.21623
-1 0.01753 0.03506 0.11313 0.22626
0 0.19580 0.39159 -0.02625 -0.05249
1 0.06966 0.13931 -0.16350 -0.32700
2 -0.03848 -0.07696 -0.41248 -0.82497
3 -0.09637 -0.19274 -0.45194 -0.90388
-1 0.07365 0.22095 0.09242 0.27727
0 -0.55231 -1.65693 * -0.79424 -2.38271 **
1 -0.46174 -1.38523 -0.63695 -1.91085 *
2 -0.44993 -1.34978 -0.60241 -1.80723 *













company resulting from the scandal. There is a significant result for CMRM on the third day 
after the announcement, but it is positive.  
In the Technology industry, the CMRM shows negative ACSAR from all days of the event 
window after the announcement. However, only the day of the announcement’s result is 
significant. In what concerns MM, all days after the announcement are negative and significant 
at least 10% level. The day of the announcement is the one with the most negative ACSAR and 
with the highest significance – 5% level.  
 
With this event window, only Technology shows a negative impact from the scandal’s 
announcement in the CMRM. In the case of MM being applied, Consumer Cyclicals and 
Technology are the two industries that show negative influence from the event, but it is the 
Technology industry that shows a lengthy and stronger effect from the corporate scandal. 
 
Applying the event window (0,3), different conclusions can be taken. The results can be 
analysed in table 9 presented below.  
 
Industrials do not show any statistical significance for either of the models, while Consumer 
Non-Cyclicals, Financials, Healthcare are significant except if the results are taken from 
CMRM.  
Consumer Cyclicals, in the CMRM, in any event window, confirm negative ACSARs. 
However, only the announcement day and the day after are significant. In the MM, only the day 
of the announcement and the day after have negative ACSARs, but only the day after the 
announcement is significant. In this case, at 5% level. It is possible to verify some delay in 
investors’ reaction. The other two days also have significant ACSARs but with positive results, 
showing that companies start recovering from the scandals on the second day after the 
announcement.  
In terms of the Consumer Non-Cyclicals industry, for MM, all ACSARs are positive, and the 
last day of the event is significant at 5% level, providing no impact from the scandals. Regarding 
Financials, as previously mentioned, no significant ACSAR was found for CMRM. In addition 
to that, MM show statistically significant results for the second and third day after the 
announcement, with a positive effect.  
Concerning Healthcare, MM shows negative and significant ACSARs at 5% level on the third 
day after the announcement.  
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The last industry, Technology, shows similar results between models. A negative and 
significant ACSARs of at least 5% level are shown every day. 
 
Table 9: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of each industry for CMRM and 
MM, for the event windows (0,3). The industries are Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, Financials, 
Healthcare, Industries, and Technology. The z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no ACSAR is equal 
to zero is rejected or not. 
 
For this event window, in the CMRM, only Consumer Cyclicals and Technology suffered an 
impact from the scandal, but it is the industry Technology that shows the strongest and lengthy 
influence from the scandals’ announcement. Looking into the MM, Consumer Cyclicals and 
Healthcare display some impact from the event but, like CMRM, is the industry Technology 
that shows the strongest and lengthy influence from the announcement of corporate scandals. 
  
Afterward, the industry results considering the last event window (-1,1) are presented in Table 
10. Consumer Non-Cyclicals, Financials, Healthcare, and Industrials do not present any 
Window Sample Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
0 -0.57562 -2.07543 ** -0.22336 -0.80534
1 -0.83401 -3.00705 *** -0.57130 -2.05985 **
2 -0.21266 -0.76677 0.54856 1.97788 **
3 -0.15954 -0.57524 0.98808 3.56257 ***
0 -0.06085 -0.10540 0.34420 0.59617
1 -0.42782 -0.74101 0.16559 0.28681
2 -0.24543 -0.42510 0.70008 1.21258
3 -0.05544 -0.09602 1.47547 2.55559 **
0 -0.36529 -1.15514 -0.01960 -0.06198
1 -0.26751 -0.84593 0.31519 0.99671
2 -0.33348 -1.05456 0.57218 1.80940 *
3 -0.33969 -1.07420 0.71449 2.25942 **
0 0.10883 0.10883 -0.47816 -0.47816
1 -0.13397 -0.13397 -1.46892 -1.46892
2 -0.24282 -0.24282 -1.40166 -1.40166
3 -0.51331 -0.51331 -1.66907 -1.66907 *
0 -0.14958 -0.29917 0.26005 0.52009
1 -0.27933 -0.55867 0.10441 0.20883
2 -0.54077 -1.08155 -0.09298 -0.18597
3 -0.56098 -1.12196 -0.23141 -0.46282
0 -1.21700 -3.65100 *** -0.85960 -2.57880 ***
1 -0.84642 -2.53927 ** -0.87672 -2.63016 ***
2 -0.74757 -2.24272 ** -0.97280 -2.91839 ***













significance level in any model. In addition, Consumer Cyclicals does not prove to be 
statistically significant for CMRM.  
 
Table 10: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of each industry for CMRM and 
MM, for the event windows (-1,1). The industries are Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, Financials, 
Healthcare, Industrials, and Technology. The z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no ACSAR is equal 
to zero is rejected or not. 
 
It is possible to state that for Consumer Cyclicals in the MM, the day after the announcement 
has a negative and significant ACSAR at 5% level of confidence. For Technology, in the case 
of CMRM, the day of the announcement is negative and significant at 10% level of confidence. 
Under MM’s case, this industry has a significantly negative ACSAR for the day of the 
announcement, and the day after it, showing negative influence on the value of the company 
after the hit of the scandal. 
  
In this event window, taking into account CMRM alone, only Technology shows some impact 
from the executives’ scandals announcements. Regarding MM, Consumer Cyclicals and 
Technology suffer a negative influence from the event. Though, it is Technology, like in the 
other two event windows, that seems to suffer more from the scandals’ announcement.  
 
Window Sample Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
-1 0.22071 0.79579 -0.01365 -0.04920
0 0.01041 0.03752 -0.40195 -1.44925
1 -0.18406 -0.66363 -0.66887 -2.41166 **
-1 0.72695 1.25911 0.27606 0.47815
0 0.75757 1.31214 0.15203 0.26332
1 0.51550 0.89287 -0.19030 -0.32961
-1 0.00245 0.00736 -0.30283 -0.95764
0 -0.01236 -0.03707 -0.47245 -1.49401
1 0.18265 0.54795 -0.39324 -1.24352
-1 1.10351 1.10351 0.54427 0.54427
0 0.44180 0.44180 0.46190 0.46190
1 -0.21197 -0.21197 0.20472 0.20472
-1 0.01753 0.03506 0.11313 0.22626
0 0.19580 0.39159 -0.02625 -0.05249
1 0.06966 0.13931 -0.16350 -0.32700
-1 0.07365 0.22095 0.09242 0.27727
0 -0.55231 -1.65693 * -0.79424 -2.38271 **













Depending on the event window and the chosen model, the conclusions are somehow different. 
But it is interesting to note that Consumer Cyclicals, in the case of MM, for all event windows 
show negative impact from the scandals. However, it is the industry Technology that regardless 
of the model and the event window, significant and negative results on the company are 
provided by the corporate scandal committed by its executives.  
 
To understand the robustness of the previous analysis, the following table 11 summarizes the 
non-parametric results.  
 
Table 11: This table shows the results for non-parametric tests - Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test for each 
industry for CMRM and MM, for the three-event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). 
 
The Generalized Sign Test, using CMRM, is significant at 5% level for Consumer Cyclicals in 
the event Windows (-1,3) and (0,3), but it seems that those results derive from the number of 
positive abnormal returns, and not from the expected negative abnormal returns. The results of 
the same test for the case of MM show significance in the event window (-1,3) at 5% level and 
in the event window (0,3) at 10% level of confidence, in the case of Financials industry. It is 
again shown inconsistency with the parametric tests. But not strangely as the Generalized Sign 
Test only takes into consideration the sign of the results and not their magnitude.  
In terms of the Rank Test, because this one considers the magnitude of the values, more 
significant results can be retrieved. In the CMRM, Healthcare and Technology are significant 
Window Industry CMRM MM CMRM MM
Consumer Cyclicals 2.37974 ** 0.91438 -0.1885 -0.62934
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 1.18818 0.50391 0.87119 -0.47860
Financials 0.64797 -2.43976 ** -1.4622 -2.90064 ***
Healthcare -0.96077 -0.97628 -5.6214 *** 4.16205 ***
Industrials -1.43355 -1.49675 0.45433 -1.93911 *
Technology -0.83525 -1.00000 -2.1684 ** -2.28382 *
Consumer Cyclicals 2.37974 ** 0.91438 -0.22979 -0.71381
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 1.18818 -0.65184 1.00785 -0.61006
Financials 1.29336 -1.80704 * -1.62157 -3.13366 ***
Healthcare -0.96077 -0.97628 -7.37639 *** 4.98517 ***
Industrials -0.41250 -0.45444 0.44345 -2.43711 **
Technology -0.15948 -0.33333 -2.58006 *** -2.67678 ***
Consumer Cyclicals 0.68154 0.91438 -0.34605 -0.99875
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 1.18818 -0.65184 1.23236 -0.75986
Financials 0.64797 -1.17432 -2.01327 ** -3.88616 ***
Healthcare -0.96077 1.02430 -5.80375 *** 5.38640 ***
Industrials 0.60854 0.58786 0.36643 -2.34116 **
Technology -0.83525 -1.00000 -2.94885 *** -2.90683 ***
(0,3)
(-1,1)




in all event windows, and Financial is also significant in the event window (-1,1) at 5% level. 
In the case of using MM, only Consumer Cyclicals and Consumer Non-Cyclicals are not 
significant in any event windows. Furthermore, in this model, Healthcare rejects the null 
hypothesis of no abnormal returns, but it seems to come with positive abnormal returns.  
 
The most similar result from both types of tests – parametric and non-parametric – is still the 
industry Technology, since the Rank Test have similar results to the parametric tests. The 
justification for this result can come by the fact that this industry is always innovating, meaning 
that it is highly dependent on investment to use on R&D. Moreover, it is also probable that this 
is the industry that people know more about since they are using technology in almost every 
moment of their daily life, and thus has more media coverage. That because, people, nowadays, 
are highly dependent on this type of companies and they create a relationship of trust. When a 
scandal happens, people fell that this relation broke. The latest example is the privacy scandal 
committed by Facebook and Cambridge Analytics where their shares went down nearly 40%. 
To better understand, this industry involves companies like Google (Alphabet Inc), Amazon, 
Apple, Microsoft, between others. 
 
5.5. Group of Corporate Scandals divided by the 
Executive’s Position 
To understate the different impact of being a top position executive and a lower position 
executive, this section groups all the corporate scandals by their executives’ position and 
analyses the respective ACSARs. All results are presented in the following Table 12.  
 
When starting with the event window (-1,3), it is possible to observe that in CMRM, both 
executives’ position does not present any negative nor statistically significance. By looking into 
MM, the top position shows negative ACSARs every day from the event window, but only the 
day of the announcement is significant, at 5% level. The lower position has negative results in 
every day since the day of the announcement, but it is only significant from the day after the 
announcement forward. This situation is again related to the delay of investors’ reaction. 
Regarding the event window (0,3), for CMRM, all results are negative, but only the day of the 
announcement is significant for top position executives, in this case, at 1%level of confidence. 
The lower executive position shows negative and significant ACSARs, at least 5% level, every 
day since the day of the announcement. On the contrary, MM has only an unfavourable result 
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on the day of the scandal’s announcement for the top position. The second and the third day 
after the announcement also have significant results, but positive, already showing some 
recovery from the hit. Additionally, the lower position shows negative ACSARs for all days of 
the event, with only the day after the announcement being significant. 
Regarding the event window (-1,1), CMRM does not show to be statistical significance for 
either of the executives’ positions. Oppositely, MM has a negative ACSAR for all days of the 
event window for the top position, but ACSAR is only significant on the day of the 
announcement. In the case of a lower position, only the day after the announcement presents a 
negative and significant ACSAR.  
 
Table 12: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of corporate scandals committed 
by top position executives grouped or scandals committed lower position executives grouped for CMRM and MM, 
for the three-event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). The z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no 
ACSAR is equal to zero is rejected or not. 
 
 To ensure the quality of the parametric results, non-parametric tests were conducted. The 
following table 13 shows these results.  
Window Sample Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
-1 0.15407 0.65366 -0.15634 -0.66327
0 -0.18057 -0.76608 -0.57919 -2.45730 **
1 0.16257 0.68973 -0.27455 -1.16480
2 0.30259 1.28379 -0.33000 -1.40009
3 0.48524 2.05868 -0.21747 -0.92265
-1 0.18809 0.88220 0.10296 0.48292
0 0.08131 0.38137 -0.26634 -1.24925
1 -0.27432 -1.28668 -0.65630 -3.07833 ***
2 0.01640 0.07692 -0.36433 -1.70886 *
3 0.08152 0.38237 -0.42125 -1.97582 **
0 -0.66326 -2.81396 *** -0.40968 -1.73811 *
1 -0.22546 -0.95653 0.12875 0.54623
2 -0.29065 -1.23313 0.45300 1.92190 *
3 -0.16449 -0.69786 0.93394 3.96238 ***
0 -0.49193 -2.30734 ** -0.08488 -0.39811
1 -0.89143 -4.18118 *** -0.68352 -3.20600 ***
2 -0.48809 -2.28936 ** -0.16951 -0.79508
3 -0.53102 -2.49071 ** -0.02414 -0.11323
-1 0.15407 0.65366 -0.15634 -0.66327
0 -0.18057 -0.76608 -0.57919 -2.45730 **
1 0.16257 0.68973 -0.27455 -1.16480
-1 0.18809 0.88220 0.10296 0.48292
0 0.08131 0.38137 -0.26634 -1.24925













The Generalized Sign Test only shows significant results at 10% level for the top executive’s 
position in the event window (-1,3) for MM, and in the event window (0,3) for CMRM. In 
addition, with this last event window with the same model, the GST is also high for the lower 
position.  
Regarding Rank Test, the top position is significant for all event windows in the MM, and in 
the CMRM, it is only significant in the event window (-1,1). 
 
 
Table 13: This table shows the results for non-parametric tests - Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test – of corporate 
scandals committed by top position or lower position executives, for CMRM and MM, for the three-event 
windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). 
 
Predictably, the Generalized Sign Test shows less significant results than the Rank Test because 
it does not consider magnitude. Furthermore, it is possible to state that in these non-parametric 
tests, the lower position is never statistically significant. 
 
To conclude, even though these results are not similar to the parametric ones, it is logical that 
scandals commit by top executives affect more than scandals exercised by lower executives. 
The Top Executives are CEOs, CFOs, Founders, Presidents, among others who typically have 
stronger media coverage. Consequently, investors react quicker and more often against 
executives of companies they intend to invest in, considering them as not trustable. 
 
5.6. Group of Corporate Scandals divided by Current or 
Former Executive 
This section serves the purpose of analysing the group of companies that have a corporate 
scandal committed by a former or a current executive by focusing on how this affects the value 
of the companies in the market. Having a look to the three-event windows in Table 14, different 
Window Position CMRM MM CMRM MM
Top 1.28992 -1.80113 * 1.47749 1.67817 *
Lower 0.64901 -0.17754 0.56067 0.96633
Top 1.76626 * -0.38663 1.61877 1.86343 *
Lower 1.50977 -0.60845 0.58647 1.01188
Top 0.81359 -0.38663 1.68649 * 2.04964 **
Lower 0.64901 0.25338 0.62002 1.14592






results were taken, but one of the conclusions still holds: former executives have the power to 
affect the value of the company. 
 
Table 14: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of corporate scandals committed 
by current or former executives grouped for CMRM and MM, for the three-event windows: (-1,3), (0,3), and (-
1,1). The z test determines whether the null hypothesis of no ACSAR is equal to zero is rejected or not. 
 
By analysing the event window (-1,3), in the CMRM, both former and current executives are 
not statistically significant, even though former executives present a negative ACSAR for 
announcement day and the day after. Regarding MM, former executives, after the 
announcements have all ACSARs negative and significant at least 5% level. The current 
executive also presents negative ACSAR, but they are not significant. 
In terms of the event window (0,3), CMRM has negative and significant ACSARs for the group 
of companies with scandals committed by former executives. For the group of current 
executives, all ACSARs are negative, although not significant. Related to the MM, former 
executives have negative and significant ACSARs at 1% level on the day of the announcement 
and the day after. Concerning current executives in the MM, the results of the second and the 
Window Sample Day ACSAR Z ACSAR Z
-1 0.31445 1.40625 0.01824 0.08156
0 -0.18137 -0.81113 -0.66911 -2.99234 ***
1 -0.23321 -1.04294 -0.84443 -3.77640 ***
2 0.03879 0.17345 -0.58302 -2.60735 ***
3 0.27981 1.25136 -0.43843 -1.96070 **
-1 0.03111 0.13913 -0.04568 -0.20431
0 0.10830 0.48435 -0.14514 -0.64908
1 0.07777 0.34779 -0.12459 -0.55720
2 0.25159 1.12514 -0.11475 -0.51316
3 0.24657 1.10270 -0.22067 -0.98687
0 -0.97726 -4.37043 *** -0.58150 -2.60057 ***
1 -1.06314 -4.75450 *** -0.73903 -3.30506 ***
2 -0.69300 -3.09921 *** -0.25197 -1.12686
3 -0.50944 -2.27829 ** 0.29257 1.30841
0 -0.16079 -0.71908 0.11943 0.53411
1 -0.12035 -0.53821 0.10303 0.46078
2 -0.10548 -0.47174 0.47321 2.11625 **
3 -0.22272 -0.99604 0.52142 2.33188 **
-1 0.31445 1.40625 0.01824 0.08156
0 -0.18137 -0.81113 -0.66911 -2.99234 ***
1 -0.23321 -1.04294 -0.84443 -3.77640 ***
-1 0.03111 0.13913 -0.04568 -0.20431
0 0.10830 0.48435 -0.14514 -0.64908














third day after the announcement are significant at 5% level, but they are positive. Therefore, it 
does not show any negative impact from the announcement of the misconduct.  
Regarding the event window (-1,1), it is possible to see that, in the CMRM, corporate scandals 
do not harm companies whether corporate scandals were committed by former or current 
executives because there is not any statistically significant result. For MM, former executives 
show negative and significant ACSARs at 1% level since the day of the announcement. In the 
case of current executives, even all ACSARs from the event window are negative, no statistical 
evidence was found.  
 
As previous sections, to check the robustness of the parametric results, the following table 15 
shows the performed two non-parametric results: Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test. 
 
Table 15: This table shows the results for non-parametric tests - Generalized Sign Test and Rank Test – of corporate 
scandals committed by current or former executives grouped, for CMRM and MM, for the three-event windows: 
(-1,3), (0,3), and (-1,1). 
 
The Generalized Sign Test only shows significant results in the MM, for current executives in 
the event window (-1,3). With respect to the Rank test, neither CMRM nor MM show 
significant results. 
 
The obtained results show some contradiction conclusions between the parametric and non-
parametric results. In addition to that, besides the theoretical flaws of the tests to explain these 
differences, it was expected that corporate scandals committed by current executives would 
have more influence on the value of the company after the scandal. However, such a result was 
not found, neither in the parametric nor in the non-parametric tests. Moreover, it is difficult to 
understand if the distinction between former and current executive creates different 
implications on the value of the company after the scandal.  
 
Window Executive CMRM MM CMRM MM
Former 1.29222 -0.38285 1.04782 1.48722
Current 0.10360 -1.94515 * 0.85497 1.08376
Former 1.29222 -0.83011 1.11900 1.58013
Current 1.46682 -0.60058 0.91871 1.17444
Former 0.37575 -0.38285 1.04782 1.04782
Current 0.55801 -0.15238 0.85497 0.85497







The section aims to analyse which features will imply a bigger impact in corporations after the 
corporate scandal is disclosed, that is: which features of the scandal the market will penalise 
more severely. The chosen elements from the four regressions were previously mentioned in 
this thesis, in section 4.4. Afterward, an interpretation of those results will be made in order to 
understand which of those will yield a more significantly negative result. The following table 
16 presents all the results for the event window (-1,1). The other two event windows are 
presented in Appendix E. 
  
This event window, (-1,1), show some significant results in both models.  
 
Table 16: This table shows the results of CARs OLS regression for CMRM and MM, on an established explanatory 
variable, for the event window (-1,1). 
 
By looking at CMRM, the top position has a negative and significant T-stat at 5% level, and 
the lower position has a positive and significant coefficient at 1% level. This means that a 
company that has a top executive involved in a scandal will be harshly punished by the market. 
Event Window (-1,1)
Regression Explanatory Variables Coefficients T-Stat Coefficients T-Stat
Intercept -0,01201 -0,87855 -0,02440 -1,78055 *
Dummy Financials 0,01725 0,83242 0,01395 0,67109
Dummy Technology -0,00187 -0,08773 0,00254 0,11838
Dummy Consumer Non-
Cyclicals
0,02553 0,80890 0,01653 0,52223
Dummy Industrials 0,01656 0,58772 0,02250 0,79623




Intercept -0,00551 -0,51633 -0,01799 -1,68692 *




Intercept -0,02395 -2,29768 ** -0,03165 -2,95564 ***




Intercept 0,00121 0,11460 -0,00524 -0,50460















On the contrary, a scandal involving a lower position executive, does not affect the company 
negatively. 
 
Regarding MM, only the regression which tests whether being a current or former executive 
there is not any feature that the market is punishing the company after the corporate scandal is 
announced since does not have any feature found significant.  
In the industry’s regression, the interception, i.e., the coefficient that absorbs the impact of the 
industry Consumer Cyclicals has negative and significant T-stat at 10% level.  
In addition to that, the regression where the type of scandal is analysed, the interception is 
significant at 10% and is negative. The interception, in this case, absorbs the impact of the 
sexual type of corporate scandals.  
Moreover, it was found significant T-stats in the regression where the executive’s position is 
analysed. The top position executives have a negative and significant result at 1% level of 
confidence, and the lower position executives have a positive and significant T-stat at 5% level. 
Hence, this last type does not show any negative impact of the scandal. Therefore, it is possible 
to argue that if the company that suffers a corporate scandal is from the cyclical consumer 
industry or if the scandal is of the sexual type or even if it is committed by a top position 
executive, the company will have a more severe impact with the scandal. 
 
By looking at Appendix E, it can be seen that in both event windows – (0,3) and (-1,3) - a top 
executive position implies bigger damage to the companies after the scandal’s announcement. 
Also, in the event window (0,3), in the regression where the industry is analysed, Healthcare is 
negative and significant at 10% level in the CMRM. However, as already mentioned, industry 
healthcare only has one company in all dataset.  
 
Succinctly, with these results, it is possible to outline that the main result is the impact that the 
companies suffer with the top executive’s position. In both models, this feature has the most 
negative coefficients. It seems that is the most important feature for the market when it is 
present with a corporate scandal committed by an Executive.  
 
It is also possible to note that when the length of the event window is minimized, more 
significant results were recognized. This is expected because, with a larger event window, there 





As mentioned in the methodology, it is vital to ensure that the following assumptions, provided 
by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), are being respected: Market efficiency, unanticipated event, 
and isolation of confounding effects. Tough, these assumptions are often violated, affecting the 
results of the study. To make sure the results of the corporate scandals committed by executives 
follow these assumptions, the validation of the findings is performed in this section. 
 
5.8.1.  Market Efficiency 
This section tries to determine if the effects of the corporate scandals committed by executives 
are immediately reflected in the stock market prices, or if investors responded with delay to the 
announcements.  
The results of all the three-event windows show significant slow reactions of the investors for 
Consumer Cyclicals and lower position scandals for MM. Furthermore, personal scandals show 
a slow reaction from the investors in two event windows: (-1,3) and (-1,1). Some other late 
reactions were discovered, but there was not any pattern between the event windows. Due to 
this reason, they were not considered.  
The reason why Consumer Cyclicals have a delayed reaction from investors has to do with the 
fact that of the 13 analysed scandals, only two of them are financial scandals, and the rest are 
personal scandals. By analysing this correlation with personal scandals, out of the 20 corporate 
scandals analysed, 11 come from personal scandals, i.e., more than 50% of these scandals come 
from Consumer Cyclicals. Therefore, this result shows that there is a correlation between these 
two categories. Moreover, delay in investors’ reactions to personal misconduct can come from 
the fact that when investors are presented to this type of scandals, they will try to understand 
what happened precisely. Understand which type of implications this episode have on the 
company’s performance, and what is going to happen to the executive, for example, if he/she 
is going to be fired.  
In relation to the position of lower executives, it is easy to understand why this position shows 
a delayed reaction from investors. They usually have fewer media coverage than the position 
of higher executives. 
However, all these results do not invalidate the assumption of market efficiency. In all cases, 
the day of the announcement presents negative reactions, they are just not significant, but they 




5.8.2.  Anticipation 
In a perfect economical world, markets would not have access to information until it was 
released. However, investors may get information before the real announcement of the scandal.   
In an attempt to analyse this question, this dissertation includes the day before the scandals’ 
announcement in two event windows: (-1,3) and (-1,1). 
By analysing all the results, only the corporate scandal committed by executives in Google 
presents negative abnormal returns different from zero in both event windows. The reason for 
this is going to be further analysed, since a confounding effect is present. 
 
5.8.3.  Confounding Events 
In this section, this dissertation analyses the presence of confounding events within the event 
windows. The fact that the event windows are relatively short reduces the probability of the 
event being affected by them.  
In any case, all the database was analysed. The investigation reveals two possible confounding 
events.  Firstly, on 14th November of 2017, Tesla factory workers have filed a lawsuit alleging 
racism and unsafe conditions. This announcement was made one day after the announcement 
of the personal misconducted, but there was not find any negative significant abnormal return 
from the scandal or the lawsuit. Thus, the scandal is included. Secondly, on the same day that 
the personal scandal committed in Alphabet was announced, the Q3 earnings were announced. 
Therefore, the calculations were performed excluding this scandal. The results show that there 
is almost no difference between the conclusions with or without this scandal. Consequently, to 















This dissertation intends to extend prior research on corporate misconduct committed by 
executives and its effects on the value of their companies. All the examined corporate scandals 
are from US companies from the S&P 500 and NASDAQ between January 2013 and March 
2019. The previous literature focuses almost exclusively on the analysis of financial firms' 
scandals. Nevertheless, with society more open to diversity and the current change of 
awareness, movements like #MeToo appear. In this sense, the corporate scandals considered in 
this study are not limited to any particular characteristic; the only condition being their relation 
to a firm's executive. 
To test whether companies that suffer from a corporate scandal committed by an executive 
experienced significant loss during the event, an event study methodology was applied by using 
stock market data extracted from Thomson Reuters. By applying three-event windows – (-1,3), 
(0,3) and (-1,1) – and two models, CMRM and MM, this dissertation finds that corporate 
scandals negatively affect the stock price of the respective companies. In addition to that, 
between personal and financial misconduct scandals, financial scandals show the most negative 
impact on the stock performance of their companies, as expected. These results were confirmed 
by checking the robustness of the parametric tests through non-parametric tests.  
From all the industries where executives committed scandals, Technology provided a negative 
impact on the value of the companies regardless of the model and the chosen event window. 
Moreover, Consumer Cyclicals show some negative stimulus on their respective companies in 
all event windows for MM. Through the non-parametric tests, different conclusions are taken 
since more industries present significant results. However, the only consistent result was again 
Technology, since the Rank Test is significant in both models for all event windows in this 
industry. These results were not expected since it was not expected that some industries had 
more power than others. Though, this dissertation finds out that the industry that is more 
negatively influenced by corporate scandals committed by executives is Technology.  
Regarding the executive's position, parametric tests do not find the difference between the top 
and lower position. Nevertheless, it discovers that both positions are affected by corporate 
scandals. That way, by checking the robustness of these results, the non-parametric tests find 
that lower executive position does not affect the value of the companies when the scandal is 
disclosed. This result is expected since top position executives have more decision power and 
more media coverage.  
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When analysing the difference between scandals committed by a former or a current executive, 
some inconsistency is found. The parametric tests find statistically significant for former 
executives. However, when non-parametric tests are considered, the only found statistically 
evidence was of current executives, in the Generalized Sing Test for MM. Therefore, it is 
difficult to understand if this distinction between former and current executives makes a 
difference in the value of the company after the scandal. This not follows the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, as it was expected that current executives would influence more negatively the 
company's stock price than the scandals committed by former executives 
To conclude, regression analysis was done to understand which features would imply a harder 
market reaction on the company’s stock price after the corporate scandal is announced. The 
event window (-1,1) is the event window that shows more statistically evidence. When using 
CMRM, top executives negatively affect the value of the company in the market. In the case 
when MM is applied, being from the industry Consumer Cyclicals, or a scandal committed by 
a top executive or even personal misconduct scandals imply bigger impact on the value of the 
companies after the scandals' announcement. The top executive position also shows statistical 
significance for MM in the other two event windows. 
  
Although this dissertation presents valuable insights, some limitations can be addressed and 
may open areas for future research. 
Due to the lack of databases corresponding to the topic, it is difficult to know which companies 
suffered from a scandal committed by one of their executives. Thus, the fact that it was 
necessary to search one by one limits the size of the sample. In this case, it only involves 
companies listed in S&P500 and NASDAQ. This has many implications, like the length of the 
chosen database or the data analysis. The industry analysis is an example of that since industry 
Healthcare only has one company in this database. In addition to that, the fact that personal 
misconduct scandals are many times suppressed by the companies where they are committed 
in order not to ruin their reputations, it limits the personal scandals sample. Moreover, due to 
financial misconduct scandals, executives have often resigned or been fired by the time when 
the company discovers that the government is investigating it, may have occurred in the 
meantime, some leakage or even be anticipated by investors. This situation can minimize 
investor reactions when the scandal is announced. 
  
Finally, for future research, increasing the database for a longer length and with more listed 
companies could benefit the insights. It would be interesting to analyse this topic for different 
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countries, to compare the different reactions between them. Finally, it would be interesting to 
understand if the current social movements, such as #MeToo, are already able to influence the 
opinion of investors differently when faced with a scandal of personal misconduct. This could 
be done by comparing the reactions of investors when they nowadays face personal misconduct 
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Table 1: This table shows the scandals and more information related to name of executives involved and the date 
of the announcement. 
Nº Name of the company Date Executives Involved
1   Tesla Inc 27/09/18 Elon Musk
2   Apple Inc 13/02/19 Gene Levoff
3   Goldman Sachs Group Inc 31/05/18 Woojae “Steve” Jung
4   Goldman Sachs Group Inc 01/11/17 Roger Ng | Tim Leissner
5   Goldman Sachs Group Inc 30/11/18 Andrea Vella
6   Qualcomm Inc 23/09/13 Jing Wang
7   Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc 28/09/18 Gregory Wasson | Wade Miquelon
8   Micron Technology Inc 29/09/17 Anand Jayapalan
9   Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp 30/09/16 Gordon Coburn | Steven Schwartz
10   Microsoft Corp 19/12/13 Brian D. Jorgenson
11   L3 Technologies Inc 28/04/17 David Pruitt | Mark Wentlent
12   Citizens Financial Group Inc 18/11/15 Tara Lynn Petrucci
13   Equifax Inc 14/03/18 Jun Ying
14   Equifax Inc 28/06/18 Sudhakar Reddy Bonthu
15   Tiffany & Co 02/07/13 Ingrid Lederhaas-Okun
16   Raymond James Financial Inc 06/09/18 Joel N. Burstein
17   Franklin Resources Inc 14/01/15 Charles Johnson
18   Fifth Third Bancorp 04/12/13 Daniel Poston
19   United Continental Holdings Inc 08/09/15 Jeff Smisek 
20   Retrophin 17/12/15 Martin Shkreli
21   CBS Corp 06/08/18 Les Moonves
22   CBS Corp 20/11/17 Charlie Rose
23   Bank of America Corp 19/01/18 Omeed Malik
24   Tesla Inc 13/11/17 Steve Jurvetson
25   Amazon.com Inc 12/10/17 Roy Price
26   JD.com Inc 03/09/18 Richard Liu
27   Walt Disney Co 21/11/17 John Lasseter
28   Walt Disney Co 08/12/17 Jon Heely
29   Walt Disney Co 09/01/18 Stan Lee
30   Alphabet Inc 25/10/18 Andy Rubin | Richard DeVaul | Amit Singhal
31   Wynn Resorts Ltd 26/01/18 Steve Wynn
32   Morgan Stanley 07/12/17 Harold Ford Jr.
33   Morgan Stanley 27/04/18 Douglas Greenberg
34   Microsoft Corp 05/08/13 Vineet Kumar Srivastava
35   Ford Motor Co 21/02/18 Raj Nair
36   Monster Beverage Corp 23/01/18 John Kenneally
37   Nike Inc 15/03/18 Trevor Edwards
38   Tapestry Inc 21/05/18 Giovanni Morelli 
39   Intel Corp 21/06/18 Brian Krzanich









Nº Name of the company S&P500 NASDAQ Both/None
1   Tesla Inc No Yes  
2   Apple Inc Yes Yes Both
3   Goldman Sachs Group Inc Yes No  
4   Goldman Sachs Group Inc Yes No  
5   Goldman Sachs Group Inc Yes No  
6   Qualcomm Inc Yes Yes Both
7   Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc Yes Yes Both
8   Micron Technology Inc Yes Yes Both
9   Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp Yes Yes Both
10   Microsoft Corp Yes No  
11   L3 Technologies Inc Yes No  
12   Citizens Financial Group Inc Yes No  
13   Equifax Inc Yes No  
14   Equifax Inc Yes No  
15   Tiffany & Co Yes No  
16   Raymond James Financial Inc Yes No  
17   Franklin Resources Inc Yes No  
18   Fifth Third Bancorp Yes No  
19   United Continental Holdings Inc Yes Yes Both
20   Retrophin No No None
21   CBS Corp Yes No  
22   CBS Corp Yes No  
23   Bank of America Corp Yes No  
24   Tesla Inc No Yes  
25   Amazon.com Inc Yes Yes Both
26   JD.com Inc No Yes  
27   Walt Disney Co Yes No  
28   Walt Disney Co Yes No  
29   Walt Disney Co Yes No  
30   Alphabet Inc Yes Yes Both
31   Wynn Resorts Ltd Yes Yes Both
32   Morgan Stanley Yes No  
33   Morgan Stanley Yes No  
34   Microsoft Corp Yes No  
35   Ford Motor Co Yes No  
36   Monster Beverage Corp Yes Yes Both
37   Nike Inc Yes No  
38   Tapestry Inc Yes No  
39   Intel Corp Yes Yes Both










Table 1: This table shows an analysis related to the number of people involved in corporate scandals in each 







Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 0,89981% 0,51053 0,89981% 0,51053 0,57287% 0,00199 0,57287% 0,34750
0 -0,51793% -0,29386 0,38187% 0,15320 -0,75822% -0,45993 -0,18535% -0,07950
1 0,76531% 0,43421 1,14718% 0,37578 0,58097% 0,35241 0,39562% 0,13855
2 -0,04753% -0,02697 1,09965% 0,31196 0,00999% 0,00606 0,40561% 0,12302
3 0,83647% 0,47459 1,93612% 0,49126 0,98639% 0,59833 1,39200% 0,37762
0 -0,51793% -0,29413 -0,51793% -0,29413 -0,75822% -0,46048 -0,75822% -0,46048
1 0,76531% 0,43460 0,24737% 0,09933 0,58097% 0,35283 -0,17725% -0,07612
2 -0,04753% -0,02699 0,19984% 0,06552 0,00999% 0,00607 -0,16726% -0,05865
3 0,83647% 0,47501 1,03631% 0,29425 0,98639% 0,59905 0,81913% 0,24873
-1 0,89981% 0,51053 0,89981% 0,51053 0,57287% 0,00199 0,57287% 0,34750
0 -0,51793% -0,29386 0,38187% 0,15320 -0,75822% -0,45993 -0,18535% -0,07950
1 0,76531% 0,43421 1,14718% 0,37578 0,58097% 0,35241 0,39562% 0,13855
-1 0,90996% 0,69783 0,90996% 0,69783 0,78779% 0,00500 0,78779% 0,63505
0 -1,12044% -0,85924 -0,21048% -0,11414 -1,56966% -1,26533 -0,78187% -0,44567
1 1,75536% 1,34615 1,54488% 0,68401 0,86482% 0,69714 0,08294% 0,03860
2 -0,57409% -0,44026 0,97079% 0,37224 -0,85349% -0,68801 -0,77054% -0,31057
3 0,84055% 0,64460 1,81134% 0,62122 0,32592% 0,26273 -0,44462% -0,16029
0 -1,12044% -0,85904 -1,12044% -0,85904 -1,56966% -1,26432 -1,56966% -1,26432
1 1,75536% 1,34583 0,63492% 0,34421 0,86482% 0,69659 -0,70484% -0,40145
2 -0,57409% -0,44015 0,06083% 0,02693 -0,85349% -0,68746 -1,55833% -0,72469
3 0,84055% 0,64445 0,90138% 0,34554 0,32592% 0,26252 -1,23241% -0,49634
-1 0,90996% 0,69783 0,90996% 0,69783 0,78779% 0,00500 0,78779% 0,63505
0 -1,12044% -0,85924 -0,21048% -0,11414 -1,56966% -1,26533 -0,78187% -0,44567
1 1,75536% 1,34615 1,54488% 0,68401 0,86482% 0,69714 0,08294% 0,03860
-1 1,16156% 0,85770 1,16156% 0,85770 1,10785% 0,01163 1,10785% 1,04958
0 0,96179% 0,71019 2,12335% 1,10867 -0,17192% -0,16288 0,93593% 0,62699
1 0,89297% 0,65938 3,01632% 1,28592 -0,90325% -0,85573 0,03269% 0,01788
2 0,13679% 0,10100 3,15311% 1,16414 -0,59908% -0,56757 -0,56640% -0,26830
3 0,73198% 0,54050 3,88509% 1,28296 0,48819% 0,46251 -0,07821% -0,03314
0 0,96179% 0,70951 0,96179% 0,70951 -0,17192% -0,16252 -0,17192% -0,16252
1 0,89297% 0,65874 1,85476% 0,96750 -0,90325% -0,85384 -1,07517% -0,71867
2 0,13679% 0,10091 1,99155% 0,84822 -0,59908% -0,56631 -1,67425% -0,91376
3 0,73198% 0,53998 2,72353% 1,00457 0,48819% 0,46148 -1,18606% -0,56059
-1 1,16156% 0,85770 1,16156% 0,85770 1,10785% 0,01163 1,10785% 1,04958
0 0,96179% 0,71019 2,12335% 1,10867 -0,17192% -0,16288 0,93593% 0,62699
1 0,89297% 0,65938 3,01632% 1,28592 -0,90325% -0,85573 0,03269% 0,01788
-1 0,06940% 0,03063 0,06940% 0,03063 -0,09910% 0,00005 -0,09910% -0,04547
0 4,16525% 1,83844 4,23465% 1,32164 3,72737% 1,71026 3,62827% 1,17718
1 -2,05489% -0,90698 2,17976% 0,55547 -2,02119% -0,92740 1,60708% 0,42573
2 0,91164% 0,40238 3,09140% 0,68224 1,40586% 0,64506 3,01293% 0,69122
3 0,45488% 0,20077 3,54629% 0,70000 -1,01579% -0,46608 1,99714% 0,40981
0 4,16525% 1,84841 4,16525% 1,84841 3,72737% 1,72018 3,72737% 1,72018
1 -2,05489% -0,91190 2,11036% 0,66222 -2,02119% -0,93278 1,70617% 0,55677
2 0,91164% 0,40456 3,02200% 0,77427 1,40586% 0,64880 3,11203% 0,82919
3 0,45488% 0,20186 3,47688% 0,77147 -1,01579% -0,46879 2,09624% 0,48371
-1 0,06940% 0,03063 0,06940% 0,03063 -0,09910% 0,00005 -0,09910% -0,04547
0 4,16525% 1,83844 4,23465% 1,32164 3,72737% 1,71026 3,62827% 1,17718




























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 0,97343% 0,78829 0,97343% 0,78829 0,43352% 0,00178 0,43352% 0,40976
0 0,77929% 0,63108 1,75272% 1,00365 0,68778% 0,65008 1,12130% 0,74942
1 0,38413% 0,31107 2,13685% 0,99907 -0,03690% -0,03487 1,08441% 0,59176
2 0,52232% 0,42298 2,65916% 1,07671 -0,01082% -0,01023 1,07359% 0,50737
3 0,46056% 0,37296 3,11972% 1,12984 0,06595% 0,06233 1,13953% 0,48168
0 0,77929% 0,63042 0,77929% 0,63042 0,68778% 0,64986 0,68778% 0,64986
1 0,38413% 0,31074 1,16342% 0,66550 -0,03690% -0,03486 0,65089% 0,43487
2 0,52232% 0,42254 1,68574% 0,78733 -0,01082% -0,01022 0,64007% 0,34917
3 0,46056% 0,37257 2,14629% 0,86814 0,06595% 0,06231 0,70601% 0,33354
-1 0,97343% 0,78829 0,97343% 0,78829 0,43352% 0,00178 0,43352% 0,40976
0 0,77929% 0,63108 1,75272% 1,00365 0,68778% 0,65008 1,12130% 0,74942
1 0,38413% 0,31107 2,13685% 0,99907 -0,03690% -0,03487 1,08441% 0,59176
-1 1,63464% 0,74830 1,63464% 0,74830 1,00675% 0,00552 1,00675% 0,54808
0 -5,30754% -2,42968 -3,67290% -1,18891 -5,79189% -3,15312 -4,78514% -1,84204
1 -9,96851% -4,56336 -13,64141% -3,60540 -10,29644% -5,60540 -15,08158% -4,74030
2 4,27907% 1,95886 -9,36234% -2,14294 4,06674% 2,21394 -11,01484% -2,99825
3 -0,43402% -0,19868 -9,79636% -2,00556 -0,84226% -0,45853 -11,85710% -2,88678
0 -5,30754% -2,42750 -5,30754% -2,42750 -5,79189% -3,15124 -5,79189% -3,15124
1 -9,96851% -4,55927 -15,27605% -4,94039 -10,29644% -5,60206 -16,08833% -6,18952
2 4,27907% 1,95711 -10,99698% -2,90387 4,06674% 2,21262 -12,02159% -3,77626
3 -0,43402% -0,19851 -11,43100% -2,61408 -0,84226% -0,45826 -12,86385% -3,49947
-1 1,63464% 0,74830 1,63464% 0,74830 1,00675% 0,00552 1,00675% 0,54808
0 -5,30754% -2,42968 -3,67290% -1,18891 -5,79189% -3,15312 -4,78514% -1,84204
1 -9,96851% -4,56336 -13,64141% -3,60540 -10,29644% -5,60540 -15,08158% -4,74030
-1 -0,18112% -0,13363 -0,18112% -0,13363 -0,66656% 0,00373 -0,66656% -0,55901
0 1,30503% 0,96283 1,12391% 0,58633 0,10272% 0,08614 -0,56384% -0,33437
1 1,59778% 1,17881 2,72169% 1,15933 1,38818% 1,16420 0,82434% 0,39914
2 2,71580% 2,00367 5,43749% 2,00584 2,12411% 1,78138 2,94845% 1,23635
3 0,96368% 0,71098 6,40116% 2,11204 0,70425% 0,59062 3,65270% 1,36996
0 1,30503% 0,96350 1,30503% 0,96350 0,10272% 0,08612 0,10272% 0,08612
1 1,59778% 1,17964 2,90281% 1,51543 1,38818% 1,16390 1,49090% 0,88390
2 2,71580% 2,00507 5,61861% 2,39497 2,12411% 1,78092 3,61501% 1,74991
3 0,96368% 0,71148 6,58228% 2,42985 0,70425% 0,59047 4,31926% 1,81070
-1 -0,18112% -0,13363 -0,18112% -0,13363 -0,66656% 0,00373 -0,66656% -0,55901
0 1,30503% 0,96283 1,12391% 0,58633 0,10272% 0,08614 -0,56384% -0,33437
1 1,59778% 1,17881 2,72169% 1,15933 1,38818% 1,16420 0,82434% 0,39914
-1 0,10405% 0,10580 0,10405% 0,10580 -0,42431% 0,00196 -0,42431% -0,46214
0 -0,68483% -0,69636 -0,58079% -0,41759 -1,35726% -1,47828 -1,78157% -1,37209
1 2,78818% 2,83511 2,20739% 1,29589 2,24473% 2,44488 0,46316% 0,29125
2 0,85533% 0,86973 3,06273% 1,55714 0,40441% 0,44047 0,86757% 0,47246
3 0,46125% 0,46901 3,52397% 1,60250 0,12349% 0,13450 0,99106% 0,48274
0 -0,68483% -0,70071 -0,68483% -0,70071 -1,35726% -1,48392 -1,35726% -1,48392
1 2,78818% 2,85280 2,10334% 1,52176 2,24473% 2,45420 0,88747% 0,68609
2 0,85533% 0,87516 2,95868% 1,74779 0,40441% 0,44215 1,29188% 0,81547
3 0,46125% 0,47194 3,41992% 1,74959 0,12349% 0,13502 1,41537% 0,77373
-1 0,10405% 0,10580 0,10405% 0,10580 -0,42431% 0,00196 -0,42431% -0,46214
0 -0,68483% -0,69636 -0,58079% -0,41759 -1,35726% -1,47828 -1,78157% -1,37209




























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 -1,12050% -1,07850 -1,12050% -1,07850 -1,66633% 0,02870 -1,66633% -1,72208
0 0,24022% 0,23121 -0,88028% -0,59912 -0,28718% -0,29679 -1,95351% -1,42756
1 -0,11457% -0,11028 -0,99485% -0,55285 -0,51815% -0,53549 -2,47166% -1,47476
2 1,70144% 1,63766 0,70659% 0,34005 0,88023% 0,90968 -1,59143% -0,82234
3 1,64639% 1,58467 2,35297% 1,01284 0,83973% 0,86783 -0,75170% -0,34742
0 0,24022% 0,23072 0,24022% 0,23072 -0,28718% -0,29505 -0,28718% -0,29505
1 -0,11457% -0,11004 0,12565% 0,08533 -0,51815% -0,53235 -0,80533% -0,58506
2 1,70144% 1,63417 1,82709% 1,01316 0,88023% 0,90435 0,07490% 0,04443
3 1,64639% 1,58129 3,47348% 1,66807 0,83973% 0,86274 0,91463% 0,46985
-1 -1,12050% -1,07850 -1,12050% -1,07850 -1,66633% 0,02870 -1,66633% -1,72208
0 0,24022% 0,23121 -0,88028% -0,59912 -0,28718% -0,29679 -1,95351% -1,42756
1 -0,11457% -0,11028 -0,99485% -0,55285 -0,51815% -0,53549 -2,47166% -1,47476
-1 -4,62304% -2,81674 -4,62304% -2,81674 -1,00003% 0,01054 -1,00003% -1,05390
0 4,95624% 3,01975 0,33319% 0,14355 1,55845% 1,64240 0,55842% 0,41613
1 -1,23744% -0,75395 -0,90424% -0,31808 0,46512% 0,49017 1,02354% 0,62277
2 -3,96285% -2,41449 -4,86709% -1,48272 -3,78783% -3,99186 -2,76429% -1,45659
3 1,98873% 1,21170 -2,87837% -0,78430 -0,98940% -1,04269 -3,75369% -1,76912
0 4,95624% 2,97324 4,95624% 2,97324 1,55845% 1,63873 1,55845% 1,63873
1 -1,23744% -0,74234 3,71880% 1,57749 0,46512% 0,48908 2,02357% 1,50459
2 -3,96285% -2,37731 -0,24405% -0,08453 -3,78783% -3,98295 -1,76426% -1,07107
3 1,98873% 1,19303 1,74468% 0,52331 -0,98940% -1,04036 -2,75366% -1,44775
-1 -4,62304% -2,81674 -4,62304% -2,81674 -1,00003% 0,01054 -1,00003% -1,05390
0 4,95624% 3,01975 0,33319% 0,14355 1,55845% 1,64240 0,55842% 0,41613
1 -1,23744% -0,75395 -0,90424% -0,31808 0,46512% 0,49017 1,02354% 0,62277
-1 0,04131% 0,02284 0,04131% 0,02284 -0,42735% 0,00108 -0,42735% -0,25162
0 -10,09329% -5,58173 -10,05199% -3,93073 -11,95579% -7,03954 -12,38314% -5,15563
1 -9,29253% -5,13890 -19,34452% -6,17637 -8,85153% -5,21175 -21,23467% -7,21856
2 4,86985% 2,69309 -14,47467% -4,00235 5,82764% 3,43130 -15,40703% -4,53581
3 -3,35276% -1,85412 -17,82743% -4,40900 -3,80732% -2,24174 -19,21435% -5,05949
0 -10,09329% -5,81399 -10,09329% -5,81399 -11,95579% -7,37462 -11,95579% -7,37462
1 -9,29253% -5,35273 -19,38582% -7,89607 -8,85153% -5,45983 -20,80732% -9,07533
2 4,86985% 2,80515 -14,51598% -4,82755 5,82764% 3,59463 -14,97968% -5,33462
3 -3,35276% -1,93127 -17,86874% -5,14642 -3,80732% -2,34844 -18,78700% -5,79414
-1 0,04131% 0,02284 0,04131% 0,02284 -0,42735% 0,00108 -0,42735% -0,25162
0 -10,09329% -5,58173 -10,05199% -3,93073 -11,95579% -7,03954 -12,38314% -5,15563
1 -9,29253% -5,13890 -19,34452% -6,17637 -8,85153% -5,21175 -21,23467% -7,21856
-1 -0,39874% -0,29197 -0,39874% -0,29197 -0,65460% 0,00406 -0,65460% -0,62067
0 1,49336% 1,09346 1,09462% 0,56674 0,66147% 0,62718 0,00686% 0,00460
1 1,24804% 0,91383 2,34266% 0,99035 -0,07055% -0,06690 -0,06369% -0,03486
2 -0,01036% -0,00759 2,33230% 0,85387 -0,89324% -0,84694 -0,95693% -0,45367
3 2,26314% 1,65710 4,59544% 1,50481 1,69284% 1,60510 0,73591% 0,31205
0 1,49336% 1,10027 1,49336% 1,10027 0,66147% 0,63145 0,66147% 0,63145
1 1,24804% 0,91952 2,74141% 1,42820 -0,07055% -0,06735 0,59091% 0,39888
2 -0,01036% -0,00764 2,73104% 1,16172 -0,89324% -0,85270 -0,30233% -0,16663
3 2,26314% 1,66741 4,99418% 1,83978 1,69284% 1,61602 1,39051% 0,66371
-1 -0,39874% -0,29197 -0,39874% -0,29197 -0,65460% 0,00406 -0,65460% -0,62067
0 1,49336% 1,09346 1,09462% 0,56674 0,66147% 0,62718 0,00686% 0,00460





























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 0,67777% 0,44926 0,67777% 0,44926 -1,41814% 0,02058 -1,41814% -1,45141
0 -0,28103% -0,18628 0,39674% 0,18595 -1,07661% -1,10187 -2,49475% -1,80544
1 -0,09247% -0,06129 0,30427% 0,11644 0,40956% 0,41917 -2,08518% -1,23213
2 0,73839% 0,48944 1,04266% 0,34556 -0,15745% -0,16115 -2,24264% -1,14763
3 0,15800% 0,10473 1,20066% 0,35592 0,62307% 0,63769 -1,61957% -0,74128
0 -0,28103% -0,18620 -0,28103% -0,18620 -1,07661% -1,09722 -1,07661% -1,09722
1 -0,09247% -0,06127 -0,37350% -0,17499 0,40956% 0,41740 -0,66705% -0,48070
2 0,73839% 0,48924 0,36489% 0,13958 -0,15745% -0,16047 -0,82450% -0,48514
3 0,15800% 0,10469 0,52289% 0,17323 0,62307% 0,63500 -0,20143% -0,10264
-1 0,67777% 0,44926 0,67777% 0,44926 -1,41814% 0,02058 -1,41814% -1,45141
0 -0,28103% -0,18628 0,39674% 0,18595 -1,07661% -1,10187 -2,49475% -1,80544
1 -0,09247% -0,06129 0,30427% 0,11644 0,40956% 0,41917 -2,08518% -1,23213
-1 0,66267% 0,46273 0,66267% 0,46273 0,59423% 0,00280 0,59423% 0,47114
0 -0,62779% -0,43837 0,03489% 0,01723 -0,41082% -0,32572 0,18341% 0,10283
1 -0,41054% -0,28667 -0,37565% -0,15144 0,19457% 0,15427 0,37798% 0,17302
2 1,49746% 1,04564 1,12181% 0,39167 1,92720% 1,52801 2,30518% 0,91385
3 2,54731% 1,77872 3,66912% 1,14578 2,27350% 1,80257 4,57868% 1,62350
0 -0,62779% -0,43844 -0,62779% -0,43844 -0,41082% -0,32558 -0,41082% -0,32558
1 -0,41054% -0,28672 -1,03833% -0,51276 0,19457% 0,15420 -0,21625% -0,12118
2 1,49746% 1,04581 0,45913% 0,18513 1,92720% 1,52732 1,71095% 0,78286
3 2,54731% 1,77902 3,00644% 1,04984 2,27350% 1,80177 3,98445% 1,57886
-1 0,66267% 0,46273 0,66267% 0,46273 0,59423% 0,00280 0,59423% 0,47114
0 -0,62779% -0,43837 0,03489% 0,01723 -0,41082% -0,32572 0,18341% 0,10283
1 -0,41054% -0,28667 -0,37565% -0,15144 0,19457% 0,15427 0,37798% 0,17302
-1 0,61680% 0,46831 0,61680% 0,46831 0,64780% 0,00377 0,64780% 0,58189
0 0,14608% 0,11091 0,76289% 0,40957 0,14328% 0,12870 0,79108% 0,50246
1 0,71132% 0,54007 1,47421% 0,64623 0,07428% 0,06672 0,86535% 0,44878
2 1,08682% 0,82517 2,56102% 0,97224 -1,02598% -0,92159 -0,16063% -0,07214
3 2,20400% 1,67340 4,76503% 1,61796 0,50991% 0,45802 0,34928% 0,14031
0 0,14608% 0,11087 0,14608% 0,11087 0,14328% 0,12862 0,14328% 0,12862
1 0,71132% 0,53988 0,85740% 0,46015 0,07428% 0,06668 0,21755% 0,13810
2 1,08682% 0,82488 1,94422% 0,85196 -1,02598% -0,92104 -0,80843% -0,41901
3 2,20400% 1,67280 4,14822% 1,57422 0,50991% 0,45775 -0,29853% -0,13400
-1 0,61680% 0,46831 0,61680% 0,46831 0,64780% 0,00377 0,64780% 0,58189
0 0,14608% 0,11091 0,76289% 0,40957 0,14328% 0,12870 0,79108% 0,50246
1 0,71132% 0,54007 1,47421% 0,64623 0,07428% 0,06672 0,86535% 0,44878
-1 1,52141% 1,13055 1,52141% 1,13055 0,69337% 0,00372 0,69337% 0,53656
0 1,16375% 0,86478 2,68516% 1,41091 0,60437% 0,46769 1,29774% 0,71012
1 -0,08800% -0,06539 2,59716% 1,11425 -0,52270% -0,40450 0,77503% 0,34627
2 -0,54263% -0,40323 2,05453% 0,76335 -1,03035% -0,79733 -0,25531% -0,09879
3 1,79752% 1,33573 3,85205% 1,28012 0,79739% 0,61706 0,54208% 0,18760
0 1,16375% 0,86290 1,16375% 0,86290 0,60437% 0,46743 0,60437% 0,46743
1 -0,08800% -0,06525 1,07575% 0,56402 -0,52270% -0,40427 0,08167% 0,04466
2 -0,54263% -0,40235 0,53312% 0,22823 -1,03035% -0,79689 -0,94868% -0,42362
3 1,79752% 1,33283 2,33064% 0,86406 0,79739% 0,61672 -0,15129% -0,05851
-1 1,52141% 1,13055 1,52141% 1,13055 0,69337% 0,00372 0,69337% 0,53656
0 1,16375% 0,86478 2,68516% 1,41091 0,60437% 0,46769 1,29774% 0,71012



























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 0,37814% 0,24085 0,37814% 0,24085 0,35185% 0,00088 0,35185% 0,25070
0 0,61981% 0,39478 0,99795% 0,44946 0,14606% 0,10407 0,49791% 0,25086
1 -0,39020% -0,24853 0,60775% 0,22349 -1,08897% -0,77591 -0,59106% -0,24315
2 0,02936% 0,01870 0,63710% 0,20290 0,77076% 0,54919 0,17971% 0,06402
3 1,99160% 1,26852 2,62871% 0,74878 1,31291% 0,93547 1,49261% 0,47562
0 0,61981% 0,39475 0,61981% 0,39475 0,14606% 0,10407 0,14606% 0,10407
1 -0,39020% -0,24851 0,22961% 0,10340 -1,08897% -0,77590 -0,94291% -0,47506
2 0,02936% 0,01870 0,25896% 0,09522 0,77076% 0,54918 -0,17215% -0,07082
3 1,99160% 1,26843 2,25057% 0,71668 1,31291% 0,93546 1,14076% 0,40640
-1 0,37814% 0,24085 0,37814% 0,24085 0,35185% 0,00088 0,35185% 0,25070
0 0,61981% 0,39478 0,99795% 0,44946 0,14606% 0,10407 0,49791% 0,25086
1 -0,39020% -0,24853 0,60775% 0,22349 -1,08897% -0,77591 -0,59106% -0,24315
-1 0,45104% 0,25614 0,45104% 0,25614 0,13013% 0,00010 0,13013% 0,07565
0 1,48693% 0,84440 1,93797% 0,77820 1,20733% 0,70182 1,33746% 0,54975
1 -0,46484% -0,26398 1,47312% 0,48299 -0,87171% -0,50672 0,46575% 0,15631
2 -0,49172% -0,27924 0,98140% 0,27866 -0,97037% -0,56408 -0,50462% -0,14667
3 -0,04552% -0,02585 0,93588% 0,23768 -0,04126% -0,02399 -0,54588% -0,14191
0 1,48693% 0,84439 1,48693% 0,84439 1,20733% 0,70184 1,20733% 0,70184
1 -0,46484% -0,26397 1,02208% 0,41042 -0,87171% -0,50674 0,33562% 0,13796
2 -0,49172% -0,27924 0,53036% 0,17389 -0,97037% -0,56409 -0,63475% -0,21304
3 -0,04552% -0,02585 0,48484% 0,13766 -0,04126% -0,02399 -0,67602% -0,19649
-1 0,45104% 0,25614 0,45104% 0,25614 0,13013% 0,00010 0,13013% 0,07565
0 1,48693% 0,84440 1,93797% 0,77820 1,20733% 0,70182 1,33746% 0,54975
1 -0,46484% -0,26398 1,47312% 0,48299 -0,87171% -0,50672 0,46575% 0,15631
-1 1,31416% 0,71048 1,31416% 0,71048 0,53693% 0,00215 0,53693% 0,39996
0 -2,06277% -1,11521 -0,74861% -0,28619 -1,62732% -1,21219 -1,09039% -0,57434
1 0,90682% 0,49026 0,15821% 0,04938 0,10704% 0,07974 -0,98335% -0,42291
2 -3,09669% -1,67418 -2,93848% -0,79433 -1,55066% -1,15509 -2,53401% -0,94379
3 -1,73804% -0,93965 -4,67652% -1,13069 -2,58938% -1,92883 -5,12339% -1,70675
0 -2,06277% -1,11415 -2,06277% -1,11415 -1,62732% -1,21211 -1,62732% -1,21211
1 0,90682% 0,48979 -1,15595% -0,44148 0,10704% 0,07973 -1,52028% -0,80071
2 -3,09669% -1,67259 -4,25264% -1,32614 -1,55066% -1,15500 -3,07094% -1,32062
3 -1,73804% -0,93875 -5,99068% -1,61785 -2,58938% -1,92869 -5,66032% -2,10804
-1 1,31416% 0,71048 1,31416% 0,71048 0,53693% 0,00215 0,53693% 0,39996
0 -2,06277% -1,11521 -0,74861% -0,28619 -1,62732% -1,21219 -1,09039% -0,57434
1 0,90682% 0,49026 0,15821% 0,04938 0,10704% 0,07974 -0,98335% -0,42291
-1 0,20076% 0,08714 0,20076% 0,08714 -0,25572% 0,00029 -0,25572% -0,11429
0 1,21922% 0,52918 1,41998% 0,43580 0,31246% 0,13965 0,05674% 0,01793
1 -1,08473% -0,47081 0,33525% 0,08401 -1,51858% -0,67871 -1,46183% -0,37721
2 2,05337% 0,89123 2,38862% 0,51837 1,33261% 0,59559 -0,12923% -0,02888
3 1,05172% 0,45648 3,44034% 0,66779 0,56787% 0,25380 0,43865% 0,08767
0 1,21922% 0,52974 1,21922% 0,52974 0,31246% 0,13972 0,31246% 0,13972
1 -1,08473% -0,47131 0,13449% 0,04132 -1,51858% -0,67906 -1,20612% -0,38137
2 2,05337% 0,89218 2,18786% 0,54884 1,33261% 0,59590 0,12649% 0,03266
3 1,05172% 0,45697 3,23958% 0,70379 0,56787% 0,25394 0,69436% 0,15525
-1 0,20076% 0,08714 0,20076% 0,08714 -0,25572% 0,00029 -0,25572% -0,11429
0 1,21922% 0,52918 1,41998% 0,43580 0,31246% 0,13965 0,05674% 0,01793

























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 3,44670% 1,12014 3,44670% 1,12014 3,22384% 0,03720 3,22384% 1,15392
0 -0,07263% -0,02361 3,37407% 0,77537 -1,18566% -0,42439 2,03818% 0,51586
1 -13,30875% -4,32520 -9,93468% -1,86407 -14,01436% -5,01620 -11,97618% -2,47491
2 17,93992% 5,83028 8,00523% 1,30081 16,69779% 5,97669 4,72162% 0,84501
3 -2,52276% -0,81987 5,48247% 0,79682 -3,17105% -1,13502 1,55057% 0,24820
0 -0,07263% -0,02355 -0,07263% -0,02355 -1,18566% -0,42327 -1,18566% -0,42327
1 -13,30875% -4,31433 -13,38138% -3,06734 -14,01436% -5,00299 -15,20002% -3,83694
2 17,93992% 5,81563 4,55853% 0,85318 16,69779% 5,96095 1,49777% 0,30870
3 -2,52276% -0,81781 2,03577% 0,32997 -3,17105% -1,13203 -1,67327% -0,29867
-1 3,44670% 1,12014 3,44670% 1,12014 3,22384% 0,03720 3,22384% 1,15392
0 -0,07263% -0,02361 3,37407% 0,77537 -1,18566% -0,42439 2,03818% 0,51586
1 -13,30875% -4,32520 -9,93468% -1,86407 -14,01436% -5,01620 -11,97618% -2,47491
-1 1,58657% 0,75801 1,58657% 0,75801 -1,21228% 0,01128 -1,21228% -0,93061
0 0,30939% 0,14781 1,89596% 0,64052 -1,09813% -0,84299 -2,31041% -1,25412
1 1,08918% 0,52038 2,98513% 0,82342 0,48203% 0,37003 -1,82838% -0,81035
2 0,50238% 0,24002 3,48751% 0,83311 -2,01281% -1,54514 -3,84119% -1,47435
3 1,02412% 0,48929 4,51163% 0,96398 -0,16832% -0,12921 -4,00951% -1,37648
0 0,30939% 0,14785 0,30939% 0,14785 -1,09813% -0,84212 -1,09813% -0,84212
1 1,08918% 0,52049 1,39856% 0,47258 0,48203% 0,36965 -0,61610% -0,33409
2 0,50238% 0,24007 1,90094% 0,52447 -2,01281% -1,54355 -2,62891% -1,16395
3 1,02412% 0,48940 2,92506% 0,69890 -0,16832% -0,12908 -2,79723% -1,07255
-1 1,58657% 0,75801 1,58657% 0,75801 -1,21228% 0,01128 -1,21228% -0,93061
0 0,30939% 0,14781 1,89596% 0,64052 -1,09813% -0,84299 -2,31041% -1,25412
1 1,08918% 0,52038 2,98513% 0,82342 0,48203% 0,37003 -1,82838% -0,81035
-1 1,38097% 0,95526 1,38097% 0,95526 -0,72536% 0,00530 -0,72536% -0,73033
0 -0,98855% -0,68381 0,39242% 0,19194 -0,68369% -0,68837 -1,40904% -1,00317
1 1,53627% 1,06269 1,92868% 0,77026 -0,34260% -0,34495 -1,75164% -1,01825
2 1,11717% 0,77278 3,04585% 1,05346 0,02287% 0,02303 -1,72877% -0,87031
3 -0,23147% -0,16012 2,81438% 0,87064 -0,86054% -0,86644 -2,58931% -1,16591
0 -0,98855% -0,68581 -0,98855% -0,68581 -0,68369% -0,68916 -0,68369% -0,68916
1 1,53627% 1,06579 0,54772% 0,26869 -0,34260% -0,34535 -1,02629% -0,73151
2 1,11717% 0,77504 1,66489% 0,66685 0,02287% 0,02306 -1,00341% -0,58396
3 -0,23147% -0,16058 1,43342% 0,49722 -0,86054% -0,86743 -1,86395% -0,93944
-1 1,38097% 0,95526 1,38097% 0,95526 -0,72536% 0,00530 -0,72536% -0,73033
0 -0,98855% -0,68381 0,39242% 0,19194 -0,68369% -0,68837 -1,40904% -1,00317
1 1,53627% 1,06269 1,92868% 0,77026 -0,34260% -0,34495 -1,75164% -1,01825
-1 0,80436% 0,56888 0,80436% 0,56888 0,37927% 0,00125 0,37927% 0,33027
0 0,87839% 0,62124 1,68276% 0,84155 0,34020% 0,29626 0,71947% 0,44302
1 1,21694% 0,86068 2,89970% 1,18403 0,92361% 0,80430 1,64308% 0,82609
2 -0,86023% -0,60839 2,03947% 0,72120 -1,66125% -1,44665 -0,01817% -0,00791
3 -0,22803% -0,16127 1,81144% 0,57294 -0,71021% -0,61846 -0,72838% -0,28366
0 0,87839% 0,62113 0,87839% 0,62113 0,34020% 0,29630 0,34020% 0,29630
1 1,21694% 0,86052 2,09533% 1,04769 0,92361% 0,80442 1,26381% 0,77833
2 -0,86023% -0,60828 1,23511% 0,50424 -1,66125% -1,44687 -0,39744% -0,19985
3 -0,22803% -0,16124 1,00708% 0,35606 -0,71021% -0,61856 -1,10764% -0,48235
-1 0,80436% 0,56888 0,80436% 0,56888 0,37927% 0,00125 0,37927% 0,33027
0 0,87839% 0,62124 1,68276% 0,84155 0,34020% 0,29626 0,71947% 0,44302




























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 -1,02867% -0,61821 -1,02867% -0,61821 -1,53991% 0,02311 -1,53991% -1,50094
0 -1,39908% -0,84083 -2,42775% -1,03170 -3,16734% -3,08719 -4,70725% -3,24430
1 1,22884% 0,73852 -1,19891% -0,41600 -1,07304% -1,04589 -5,78029% -3,25280
2 -3,08397% -1,85342 -4,28288% -1,28698 -0,14312% -0,13950 -5,92342% -2,88676
3 0,61653% 0,37053 -3,66635% -0,98540 -0,17650% -0,17203 -6,09991% -2,65893
0 -1,39908% -0,84116 -1,39908% -0,84116 -3,16734% -3,08077 -3,16734% -3,08077
1 1,22884% 0,73881 -0,17024% -0,07238 -1,07304% -1,04372 -4,24038% -2,91645
2 -3,08397% -1,85416 -3,25421% -1,12959 -0,14312% -0,13921 -4,38350% -2,46165
3 0,61653% 0,37067 -2,63769% -0,79292 -0,17650% -0,17167 -4,56000% -2,21769
-1 -1,02867% -0,61821 -1,02867% -0,61821 -1,53991% 0,02311 -1,53991% -1,50094
0 -1,39908% -0,84083 -2,42775% -1,03170 -3,16734% -3,08719 -4,70725% -3,24430
1 1,22884% 0,73852 -1,19891% -0,41600 -1,07304% -1,04589 -5,78029% -3,25280
-1 -0,60210% -0,46910 -0,60210% -0,46910 0,08421% 0,00006 0,08421% 0,07563
0 -0,14207% -0,11069 -0,74417% -0,40997 0,32734% 0,29399 0,41155% 0,26136
1 -0,70758% -0,55129 -1,45175% -0,65303 -0,42250% -0,37945 -0,01095% -0,00568
2 0,32409% 0,25250 -1,12766% -0,43929 0,62153% 0,55820 0,61058% 0,27419
3 0,14832% 0,11556 -0,97934% -0,34123 -0,09486% -0,08519 0,51573% 0,20714
0 -0,14207% -0,11082 -0,14207% -0,11082 0,32734% 0,29451 0,32734% 0,29451
1 -0,70758% -0,55194 -0,84965% -0,46864 -0,42250% -0,38011 -0,09515% -0,06053
2 0,32409% 0,25280 -0,52556% -0,23669 0,62153% 0,55918 0,52638% 0,27342
3 0,14832% 0,11569 -0,37725% -0,14713 -0,09486% -0,08534 0,43152% 0,19412
-1 -0,60210% -0,46910 -0,60210% -0,46910 0,08421% 0,00006 0,08421% 0,07563
0 -0,14207% -0,11069 -0,74417% -0,40997 0,32734% 0,29399 0,41155% 0,26136
1 -0,70758% -0,55129 -1,45175% -0,65303 -0,42250% -0,37945 -0,01095% -0,00568
-1 1,76365% 0,98286 1,76365% 0,98286 0,77492% 0,00390 0,77492% 0,50314
0 -0,63427% -0,35347 1,12938% 0,44505 -1,37942% -0,89562 -0,60449% -0,27753
1 -0,00494% -0,00275 1,12444% 0,36179 -1,07085% -0,69528 -1,67534% -0,62802
2 2,02010% 1,12578 3,14454% 0,87621 1,30923% 0,85005 -0,36611% -0,11885
3 1,02045% 0,56869 4,16500% 1,03803 0,21214% 0,13774 -0,15397% -0,04471
0 -0,63427% -0,35279 -0,63427% -0,35279 -1,37942% -0,89540 -1,37942% -0,89540
1 -0,00494% -0,00275 -0,63921% -0,25141 -1,07085% -0,69511 -2,45026% -1,12466
2 2,02010% 1,12362 1,38090% 0,44345 1,30923% 0,84984 -1,14104% -0,42763
3 1,02045% 0,56760 2,40135% 0,66784 0,21214% 0,13770 -0,92890% -0,30148
-1 1,76365% 0,98286 1,76365% 0,98286 0,77492% 0,00390 0,77492% 0,50314
0 -0,63427% -0,35347 1,12938% 0,44505 -1,37942% -0,89562 -0,60449% -0,27753
1 -0,00494% -0,00275 1,12444% 0,36179 -1,07085% -0,69528 -1,67534% -0,62802
-1 2,26723% 1,00102 2,26723% 1,00102 1,64698% 0,01333 1,64698% 0,80909
0 3,53065% 1,55884 5,79787% 1,81010 2,39279% 1,17547 4,03977% 1,40330
1 1,65054% 0,72874 7,44842% 1,89868 0,57772% 0,28381 4,61749% 1,30965
2 0,82136% 0,36264 8,26978% 1,82563 0,10358% 0,05088 4,72107% 1,15963
3 -2,08486% -0,92050 6,18492% 1,22123 -2,61383% -1,28406 2,10723% 0,46295
0 3,53065% 1,55672 3,53065% 1,55672 2,39279% 1,17399 2,39279% 1,17399
1 1,65054% 0,72775 5,18119% 1,61536 0,57772% 0,28345 2,97051% 1,03057
2 0,82136% 0,36215 6,00255% 1,52803 0,10358% 0,05082 3,07409% 0,87079
3 -2,08486% -0,91925 3,91769% 0,86369 -2,61383% -1,28244 0,46026% 0,11291
-1 2,26723% 1,00102 2,26723% 1,00102 1,64698% 0,01333 1,64698% 0,80909
0 3,53065% 1,55884 5,79787% 1,81010 2,39279% 1,17547 4,03977% 1,40330

























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 0,30151% 0,17665 0,30151% 0,17665 1,55133% 0,02073 1,55133% 1,33642
0 -13,15344% -7,70648 -12,85192% -5,32439 -14,27362% -12,29621 -12,72229% -7,74974
1 5,73934% 3,36263 -7,11258% -2,40593 6,15837% 5,30521 -6,56392% -3,26467
2 -0,51397% -0,30113 -7,62655% -2,23416 0,13740% 0,11836 -6,42653% -2,76811
3 1,71820% 1,00668 -5,90835% -1,54810 1,10126% 0,94870 -5,32526% -2,05160
0 -13,15344% -7,70605 -13,15344% -7,70605 -14,27362% -12,31085 -14,27362% -12,31085
1 5,73934% 3,36244 -7,41409% -3,07139 6,15837% 5,31153 -8,11526% -4,94927
2 -0,51397% -0,30111 -7,92806% -2,68163 0,13740% 0,11850 -7,97786% -3,97264
3 1,71820% 1,00662 -6,20986% -1,81905 1,10126% 0,94983 -6,87660% -2,96550
-1 0,30151% 0,17665 0,30151% 0,17665 1,55133% 0,02073 1,55133% 1,33642
0 -13,15344% -7,70648 -12,85192% -5,32439 -14,27362% -12,29621 -12,72229% -7,74974
1 5,73934% 3,36263 -7,11258% -2,40593 6,15837% 5,30521 -6,56392% -3,26467
-1 0,03819% 0,02409 0,03819% 0,02409 -1,37286% 0,01297 -1,37286% -0,94470
0 -1,02824% -0,64875 -0,99005% -0,44170 -0,89690% -0,61718 -2,26976% -1,10442
1 1,39113% 0,87771 0,40108% 0,14610 1,03914% 0,71506 -1,23062% -0,48891
2 -0,61524% -0,38817 -0,21415% -0,06756 -1,01194% -0,69634 -2,24256% -0,77158
3 1,13004% 0,71298 0,91588% 0,25843 0,94841% 0,65263 -1,29415% -0,39826
0 -1,02824% -0,64954 -1,02824% -0,64954 -0,89690% -0,61637 -0,89690% -0,61637
1 1,39113% 0,87878 0,36290% 0,16210 1,03914% 0,71412 0,14224% 0,06912
2 -0,61524% -0,38864 -0,25234% -0,09203 -1,01194% -0,69543 -0,86970% -0,34507
3 1,13004% 0,71384 0,87770% 0,27722 0,94841% 0,65177 0,07871% 0,02705
-1 0,03819% 0,02409 0,03819% 0,02409 -1,37286% 0,01297 -1,37286% -0,94470
0 -1,02824% -0,64875 -0,99005% -0,44170 -0,89690% -0,61718 -2,26976% -1,10442
1 1,39113% 0,87771 0,40108% 0,14610 1,03914% 0,71506 -1,23062% -0,48891
-1 1,28236% 1,09272 1,28236% 1,09272 0,98452% 0,00928 0,98452% 0,94293
0 -1,23441% -1,05185 0,04796% 0,02890 -1,32756% -1,27148 -0,34304% -0,23232
1 -1,15120% -0,98095 -1,10324% -0,54276 -1,54693% -1,48158 -1,88997% -1,04508
2 -0,31671% -0,26987 -1,41995% -0,60498 -0,66736% -0,63917 -2,55733% -1,22465
3 -0,47145% -0,40173 -1,89140% -0,72077 -0,61788% -0,59177 -3,17521% -1,36001
0 -1,23441% -1,04978 -1,23441% -1,04978 -1,32756% -1,27159 -1,32756% -1,27159
1 -1,15120% -0,97901 -2,38560% -1,43457 -1,54693% -1,48171 -2,87449% -1,94688
2 -0,31671% -0,26934 -2,70231% -1,32683 -0,66736% -0,63922 -3,54185% -1,95868
3 -0,47145% -0,40094 -3,17376% -1,34953 -0,61788% -0,59183 -4,15973% -1,99218
-1 1,28236% 1,09272 1,28236% 1,09272 0,98452% 0,00928 0,98452% 0,94293
0 -1,23441% -1,05185 0,04796% 0,02890 -1,32756% -1,27148 -0,34304% -0,23232
1 -1,15120% -0,98095 -1,10324% -0,54276 -1,54693% -1,48158 -1,88997% -1,04508
-1 -0,35426% -0,23665 -0,35426% -0,23665 -0,22215% 0,00042 -0,22215% -0,18728
0 2,30102% 1,53711 1,94675% 0,91957 0,76705% 0,64662 0,54489% 0,32481
1 -0,34808% -0,23252 1,59868% 0,61658 -0,23656% -0,19942 0,30833% 0,15007
2 -0,42558% -0,28430 1,17309% 0,39182 -0,78369% -0,66066 -0,47536% -0,20037
3 -1,11883% -0,74740 0,05426% 0,01621 -0,99666% -0,84019 -1,47202% -0,55496
0 2,30102% 1,53695 2,30102% 1,53695 0,76705% 0,64658 0,76705% 0,64658
1 -0,34808% -0,23250 1,95294% 0,92239 -0,23656% -0,19941 0,53048% 0,31620
2 -0,42558% -0,28427 1,52735% 0,58901 -0,78369% -0,66061 -0,25321% -0,12323
3 -1,11883% -0,74732 0,40852% 0,13644 -0,99666% -0,84014 -1,24987% -0,52679
-1 -0,35426% -0,23665 -0,35426% -0,23665 -0,22215% 0,00042 -0,22215% -0,18728
0 2,30102% 1,53711 1,94675% 0,91957 0,76705% 0,64662 0,54489% 0,32481

























Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 -0,49815% -0,26885 -0,49815% -0,26885 -0,54297% 0,00169 -0,54297% -0,31099
0 -0,03768% -0,02034 -0,53583% -0,20449 -0,13294% -0,07614 -0,67591% -0,27374
1 0,78020% 0,42108 0,24437% 0,07615 0,29490% 0,16891 -0,38100% -0,12599
2 0,25314% 0,13662 0,49751% 0,13426 -0,42830% -0,24531 -0,80931% -0,23177
3 -0,56518% -0,30503 -0,06767% -0,01633 0,00875% 0,00501 -0,80056% -0,20506
0 -0,03768% -0,02037 -0,03768% -0,02037 -0,13294% -0,07618 -0,13294% -0,07618
1 0,78020% 0,42172 0,74252% 0,28380 0,29490% 0,16898 0,16196% 0,06562
2 0,25314% 0,13683 0,99566% 0,31072 -0,42830% -0,24542 -0,26634% -0,08811
3 -0,56518% -0,30549 0,43048% 0,11634 0,00875% 0,00501 -0,25760% -0,07380
-1 -0,49815% -0,26885 -0,49815% -0,26885 -0,54297% 0,00169 -0,54297% -0,31099
0 -0,03768% -0,02034 -0,53583% -0,20449 -0,13294% -0,07614 -0,67591% -0,27374
1 0,78020% 0,42108 0,24437% 0,07615 0,29490% 0,16891 -0,38100% -0,12599
-1 -0,64978% -0,32720 -0,64978% -0,32720 -0,54014% 0,00160 -0,54014% -0,29584
0 3,10877% 1,56543 2,45899% 0,87556 2,06218% 1,12949 1,52204% 0,58948
1 -0,30095% -0,15154 2,15804% 0,62740 -0,92360% -0,50587 0,59844% 0,18924
2 -0,17206% -0,08664 1,98599% 0,50002 -1,17535% -0,64376 -0,57691% -0,15799
3 0,45083% 0,22702 2,43682% 0,54876 0,07444% 0,04077 -0,50247% -0,12308
0 3,10877% 1,56617 3,10877% 1,56617 2,06218% 1,12967 2,06218% 1,12967
1 -0,30095% -0,15162 2,80782% 1,00024 -0,92360% -0,50595 1,13858% 0,44104
2 -0,17206% -0,08668 2,63576% 0,76665 -1,17535% -0,64386 -0,03677% -0,01163
3 0,45083% 0,22712 3,08659% 0,77750 0,07444% 0,04078 0,03767% 0,01032
-1 -0,64978% -0,32720 -0,64978% -0,32720 -0,54014% 0,00160 -0,54014% -0,29584
0 3,10877% 1,56543 2,45899% 0,87556 2,06218% 1,12949 1,52204% 0,58948
1 -0,30095% -0,15154 2,15804% 0,62740 -0,92360% -0,50587 0,59844% 0,18924
-1 -0,22996% -0,13942 -0,22996% -0,13942 -0,80309% 0,00484 -0,80309% -0,60219
0 -0,53231% -0,32274 -0,76227% -0,32680 -0,36671% -0,27498 -1,16980% -0,62026
1 -0,06483% -0,03931 -0,82711% -0,28952 -0,06923% -0,05191 -1,23903% -0,53641
2 1,06520% 0,64582 0,23809% 0,07218 -0,10375% -0,07779 -1,34278% -0,50344
3 1,86766% 1,13234 2,10575% 0,57096 1,31344% 0,98488 -0,02934% -0,00984
0 -0,53231% -0,32575 -0,53231% -0,32575 -0,36671% -0,27487 -0,36671% -0,27487
1 -0,06483% -0,03967 -0,59714% -0,25839 -0,06923% -0,05189 -0,43594% -0,23105
2 1,06520% 0,65185 0,46806% 0,16537 -0,10375% -0,07776 -0,53969% -0,23355
3 1,86766% 1,14292 2,33572% 0,71468 1,31344% 0,98448 0,77375% 0,28998
-1 -0,22996% -0,13942 -0,22996% -0,13942 -0,80309% 0,00484 -0,80309% -0,60219
0 -0,53231% -0,32274 -0,76227% -0,32680 -0,36671% -0,27498 -1,16980% -0,62026
1 -0,06483% -0,03931 -0,82711% -0,28952 -0,06923% -0,05191 -1,23903% -0,53641
-1 0,24195% 0,15709 0,24195% 0,15709 -0,07872% 0,00007 -0,07872% -0,08295
0 -1,08794% -0,70638 -0,84599% -0,38840 -1,29162% -1,36090 -1,37034% -1,02095
1 0,86931% 0,56443 0,02332% 0,00874 0,46737% 0,49244 -0,90297% -0,54929
2 0,75930% 0,49300 0,78262% 0,25407 -0,20909% -0,22031 -1,11207% -0,58586
3 1,06140% 0,68915 1,84402% 0,53544 -0,16079% -0,16941 -1,27285% -0,59977
0 -1,08794% -0,70733 -1,08794% -0,70733 -1,29162% -1,36940 -1,29162% -1,36940
1 0,86931% 0,56519 -0,21863% -0,10051 0,46737% 0,49551 -0,82425% -0,61793
2 0,75930% 0,49366 0,54067% 0,20295 -0,20909% -0,22169 -1,03334% -0,63253
3 1,06140% 0,69008 1,60208% 0,52080 -0,16079% -0,17047 -1,19413% -0,63302
-1 0,24195% 0,15709 0,24195% 0,15709 -0,07872% 0,00007 -0,07872% -0,08295
0 -1,08794% -0,70638 -0,84599% -0,38840 -1,29162% -1,36090 -1,37034% -1,02095























Table 1: This table shows individual ARs, CARs and the respective T-starts for each corporate scandal 
 
Company Window Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat
-1 -0,97790% -0,77585 -0,97790% -0,77585 -0,57762% 0,00424 -0,57762% -0,73416
0 -1,42828% -1,13317 -2,40617% -1,34988 -0,59611% -0,75766 -1,17374% -1,05488
1 -0,94479% -0,74958 -3,35097% -1,53495 0,34601% 0,43978 -0,82773% -0,60740
2 1,61482% 1,28117 -1,73615% -0,68872 -0,12169% -0,15466 -0,94942% -0,60336
3 -0,39844% -0,31612 -2,13459% -0,75738 -0,54943% -0,69833 -1,49884% -0,85196
0 -1,42828% -1,13192 -1,42828% -1,13192 -0,59611% -0,75714 -0,59611% -0,75714
1 -0,94479% -0,74875 -2,37307% -1,32983 0,34601% 0,43947 -0,25011% -0,22463
2 1,61482% 1,27975 -0,75825% -0,34694 -0,12169% -0,15456 -0,37179% -0,27264
3 -0,39844% -0,31577 -1,15669% -0,45834 -0,54943% -0,69784 -0,92122% -0,58504
-1 -0,97790% -0,77585 -0,97790% -0,77585 -0,57762% 0,00424 -0,57762% -0,73416
0 -1,42828% -1,13317 -2,40617% -1,34988 -0,59611% -0,75766 -1,17374% -1,05488
1 -0,94479% -0,74958 -3,35097% -1,53495 0,34601% 0,43978 -0,82773% -0,60740
-1 -1,18160% -1,03504 -1,18160% -1,03504 -0,72440% 0,00625 -0,72440% -0,86308
0 -0,69227% -0,60640 -1,87388% -1,16067 -0,44047% -0,52479 -1,16487% -0,98137
1 -0,44381% -0,38876 -2,31769% -1,17214 0,13806% 0,16449 -1,02681% -0,70632
2 2,48161% 2,17379 0,16393% 0,07180 1,36997% 1,63224 0,34316% 0,20443
3 -0,63364% -0,55504 -0,46972% -0,18401 -0,72109% -0,85914 -0,37793% -0,20137
0 -0,69227% -0,60697 -0,69227% -0,60697 -0,44047% -0,52637 -0,44047% -0,52637
1 -0,44381% -0,38912 -1,13608% -0,70434 0,13806% 0,16499 -0,30241% -0,25554
2 2,48161% 2,17582 1,34553% 0,68112 1,36997% 1,63713 1,06756% 0,73655
3 -0,63364% -0,55556 0,71189% 0,31208 -0,72109% -0,86172 0,34646% 0,20701
-1 -1,18160% -1,03504 -1,18160% -1,03504 -0,72440% 0,00625 -0,72440% -0,86308
0 -0,69227% -0,60640 -1,87388% -1,16067 -0,44047% -0,52479 -1,16487% -0,98137
1 -0,44381% -0,38876 -2,31769% -1,17214 0,13806% 0,16449 -1,02681% -0,70632
-1 -1,05316% -0,42996 -1,05316% -0,42996 0,44318% 0,00086 0,44318% 0,19479
0 1,37147% 0,55992 0,31832% 0,09189 -1,09226% -0,48008 -0,64908% -0,20173
1 0,20322% 0,08297 0,52154% 0,12293 1,55923% 0,68532 0,91015% 0,23096
2 -1,41017% -0,57572 -0,88864% -0,18140 -1,93319% -0,84969 -1,02304% -0,22483
3 -0,19801% -0,08084 -1,08665% -0,19840 -0,64353% -0,28285 -1,66657% -0,32758
0 1,37147% 0,55979 1,37147% 0,55979 -1,09226% -0,48004 -1,09226% -0,48004
1 0,20322% 0,08295 1,57469% 0,45448 1,55923% 0,68527 0,46697% 0,14512
2 -1,41017% -0,57558 0,16452% 0,03877 -1,93319% -0,84962 -1,46622% -0,37204
3 -0,19801% -0,08082 -0,03349% -0,00684 -0,64353% -0,28283 -2,10975% -0,46361
-1 -1,05316% -0,42996 -1,05316% -0,42996 0,44318% 0,00086 0,44318% 0,19479
0 1,37147% 0,55992 0,31832% 0,09189 -1,09226% -0,48008 -0,64908% -0,20173
1 0,20322% 0,08297 0,52154% 0,12293 1,55923% 0,68532 0,91015% 0,23096
-1 5,09093% 1,11510 5,09093% 1,11510 2,51092% 0,01493 2,51092% 0,59476
0 -2,20951% -0,48396 2,88142% 0,44628 0,50291% 0,11912 3,01383% 0,50479
1 -4,58713% -1,00475 -1,70570% -0,21570 -1,38107% -0,32713 1,63277% 0,22329
2 0,30967% 0,06783 -1,39603% -0,15289 -1,06404% -0,25204 0,56873% 0,06736
3 -1,23159% -0,26976 -2,62763% -0,25739 -2,79124% -0,66115 -2,22251% -0,23543
0 -2,20951% -0,48344 -2,20951% -0,48344 0,50291% 0,11904 0,50291% 0,11904
1 -4,58713% -1,00367 -6,79663% -1,05154 -1,38107% -0,32690 -0,87815% -0,14698
2 0,30967% 0,06776 -6,48696% -0,81946 -1,06404% -0,25186 -1,94219% -0,26542
3 -1,23159% -0,26947 -7,71855% -0,84441 -2,79124% -0,66070 -4,73343% -0,56021
-1 5,09093% 1,11510 5,09093% 1,11510 2,51092% 0,01493 2,51092% 0,59476
0 -2,20951% -0,48396 2,88142% 0,44628 0,50291% 0,11912 3,01383% 0,50479






















Table 1: This table shows the results of CARs OLS regression for CMRM and MM, on an established 
explanatory variable, for the event window (0,3). 
Event Window (0,3)
Regression Explanatory Variables Coefficients T-Stat Coefficients T-Stat
Intercept 0,01109 0,87749 -0,00806 -0,68409
Dummy Financials -0,00149 -0,07746 -0,00248 -0,13897
Dummy Technology -0,02391 -1,20973 -0,02082 -1,12992
Dummy Consumer Non-
Cyclicals 0,01548 0,53007 0,00678 0,24897
Dummy Industrials -0,01032 -0,39593 -0,00816 -0,33584




Intercept 0,00560 0,53841 -0,01316 -1,41825




Intercept -0,01340 -1,29518 -0,02533 -2,66349 ***




Intercept 0,00633 0,60984 -0,01051 -1,13767
















Table 2: This table shows the results of CARs OLS regression for CMRM and MM, on an established 













Regression Explanatory Variables Coefficients T-Stat Coefficients T-Stat
Intercept 0,01599 1,23942 -0,00648 -0,54923
Dummy Financials -0,00605 -0,30937 -0,00852 -0,47652
Dummy Technology -0,02594 -1,28628 -0,02037 -1,10459
Dummy Consumer Non-
Cyclicals 0,02221 0,74547 0,00923 0,33900
Dummy Industrials -0,01751 -0,65846 -0,00888 -0,36540




Intercept 0,00824 0,79578 -0,01304 -1,41424




Intercept -0,00591 -0,56156 -0,02226 -2,33234 **




Intercept 0,01003 0,96933 -0,00917 -1,00152
Dummy Former -0,00506 -0,34605 -0,00921 -0,71109
Observations 40 40
R
2 0,00314 0,01313
Current vs 
former
CMRM MM
Industry
Type 
Sexual vs 
Financial
Position of 
executive
